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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Consider the following conditional statement: had Barack Obama lost in
the election to the U.S. presidency in 2008, he would not have been the 2009
Nobel Peace Prize laureate. The conditional has a contrary-to-fact antecedent
because, in fact, Obama did win the election in 2008. It is a received view
in philosophy that there are two different kinds of conditionals, indicative and
subjunctive.1 My primary concern in this thesis is the subjunctive kind, or
counterfactual conditionals, which are often expressed in a subjunctive mood
with auxiliary verbs such as “were”, “had” and “would”, like the example just
stated.
Counterfactual reasoning is common. Indeed, we always wonder what things
would turn out to be were things to happen differently, or what would hap-
pen in a counterfactual possibility. Academically, counterfactual reasoning has
drawn the attention from different disciplines.2 In particular, philosophers and
logicians study the question of whether counterfactual conditional statements
are truth bearers, and, if they are, inquire the general truth condition of them.
The scrutiny of the truth condition and the assertability condition of condi-
tional statements in general can be traced back to its contemporary philosophi-
cal root in Ramsey (1990/1929). The discussion of the issue later was developed
more acutely by Chisholm (1946), and especially by Goodman (1955) among
other innumerable writers.3 The study of cotenability advocated by Goodman,
generally speaking, dominates the discussion of counterfactual conditionals ap-
proximately from 1950s to 1960s. To give a basic idea, a counterfactual con-
ditional “if P were the case, Q would be the case” is true, according to the
cotenability theorists, if and only if Q deductively follows from P together
with some set of facts and laws of nature.
The cotenability theory ceased to be the paradigm after certain serious crit-
icisms prevailed, especially those aimed at the unclear constraints on the sets of
1See Bennett (2003) for an in-depth survey on the indicative/subjunctive distinction.
2For example, Weber (1949) has argued for the significance of counterfactual inquiry in his-
torical explanation in sociology. Elster (1978) and Fearon (1991) have embraced the counter-
factual strategy in their research of political science. Psychologists, for instance, Kahneman
and Miller (1986), have also admitted the importance of counterfactual alternatives in the
study of norms. See Hendrickson (2010) for a detailed literature review on how counterfactual
reasoning has been broadened to diversified disciplines.
3See the entry of The Logic of Conditionals in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(SEP) for a history of the discussion.
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facts. Subsequently, a more prominent project came to take over the counterfac-
tual analysis, which is referred as the world-similarity-based, or similarity-based
for short, theories of counterfactuals. The majority of similarity-based theories
are attributed to the work of Robert Stalnaker (1968) and David Lewis (1973b).
They both make use of the possible-world semantics to study counterfactual
possibilities. The truth of a counterfactual conditional depends on whether
the consequent holds in the possible world(s) most similar to the actual world
which satisfies the counterfactual antecedent. However, to determine whether a
world w is more similar, or closer, than another world w′ to our world is not eas-
ily demonstrated. Lewis (1979) developed a system of measuring instruments
which enable philosophers to determine the distance between possible worlds.
The discussion on his system of measurement later became a focal point for
philosophers to assess the similarity-based theories of counterfactuals.4
Lewis (1973a) also famously proposed a counterfactual theory of causation,
based on his theory of counterfactuals. The classical definition of causation
given by Hume (1975/1748) is popularly referred to the following two state-
ments of his - “. . . we may define a cause to be an object followed by another,
and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar
to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first had not been, the second
never had existed”. Let alone the relata in Hume’s definition of causation, Lewis
shed light on the second statement formulated in a counterfactual conditional
whereas his contemporaries (e.g. Armstrong (1978)) focused on criticizing the
first statement concerning regularity. Even though Lewis’s counterfactual the-
ory of causation did receive criticisms, Lewis’s contribution to the discussion
of causation is beyond any doubt.5
More recently, researchers have facilitated the study of causality with rigor-
ous mathematical tools borrowed from econometricians (e.g. Strotz and Wold
1969; Fisher 1970). Instead of the reductive analysis, they favor the non-
reductive account of causation by the means of intervention, which is essen-
tially a causal term (e.g. Halpern (2000), Hausman (2005), Hitchcock (2001,
2007), Pearl (1995, 2009), Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000), Woodward
(2003)).
The interventionists, particularly Halpern and Pearl, use causal models to
give accounts of both (actual) causation and counterfactuals. That is, the
counterfactual conditional “had the variable X been the value x, the variable Y
would have taken the value y” is true if and only if by appropriately intervening
X to be x, Y would take the value y.
4For some examples, see Bennett (1984), Bigaj (2004), Elga (2001), Field (2003), Hausman
(1998), Hiddleston (2005).
5See Paul (2009) for an overview of the counterfactual theory of causation.
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The interventionists do realize the influence of Lewis’s theory of causation
in philosophy and the similarity between their work and Lewis’s. Hence, al-
most every of the mentioned interventionists has compared their own work to
Lewis’s. In this thesis, I focus on a characteristic principle in Pearl’s logic,
named reversibility. The general layout of the remaining chapters is as follows.
Chapter 2, firstly, offers an overview of the similarity-based theories of coun-
terfactuals from both Lewis and Stalnaker, and also the structure-based theory
of counterfactuals originated by Pearl. It will be argued that the principle
of reversibility does not only go beyond Lewis’s logic, but also goes beyond
Stalnaker’s logic, which is more analogous to Pearl’s than Lewis’s in light of
Pearl’s principle of definiteness. The first ambition of this thesis is to ex-
tend Stalnaker’s logic to incorporate reversibility. It will be observed that
the translation of reversibility from Pearl’s language to the standard language
for conditional logic deserves certain attention. Particularly, a straightforward
translation following Pearl’s suggestion would render reversibility incompatible
with Stalnaker’s logic. An appropriate translation will be proposed, and an
extension of Stalnaker’s logic with the inclusion of the translated reversibil-
ity will be investigated. Next, Stalnaker’s semantics will be modified and the
soundness and completeness of the extension will be demonstrated with respect
to the modified Stalnaker’s semantics.
Another important result of this thesis is presented in chapter 3, which
extends the work from Zhang, Lam, and de Clercq (2012). We revealed that
a special case of reversibility, despite its name, actually states an important
kind of irreversibility: counterfactual dependence (as defined in Lewis (1973a))
between distinct events is irreversible. Putting it differently, reversibility en-
tails that there is no cycle of counterfactual dependence featuring two distinct
events. This result will be extended with respect to different generalizations of
reversibility. Curiously, however, we have also shown that Pearl’s logic does not
rule out cycles of counterfactual dependence altogether. It in fact allows cycles
that involve three or more distinct events. From a metaphysical perspective,
the status of cyclic counterfactual dependence seems no more secure than that
of mutual counterfactual dependence. This consideration leads me to explore
logics that rule out all cycles of counterfactual dependence. A main result is
that the extension of Stalnaker’s logic I developed in chapter 2 is precisely a
logic of this sort.
3
CHAPTER 2
Incorporating the Principle of Reversibility in Stalnaker’s
Logic
The discussion on counterfactuals, from 1970s onwards, has been primar-
ily devoted to the works established by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker.1
Their theories of counterfactuals rely on the possible-world semantics and dis-
tance measurements among possible worlds. Despite the emergence of new
theories,2 Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s works have retained a wide-acceptance in
philosophy. More recently, the structure-based framework of counterfactuals,
derived from Judea Pearl’s causal modeling, has been gaining ground in philo-
sophical circles.3 In this chapter, an overview of the semantics and logics of
both frameworks will be presented. This will be followed by a comparison of
Pearl’s logic to Stalnaker’s logic, which aims to explore the claim that Stal-
naker’s logic is more analogous to Pearl’s than Lewis’s in light of the Pearl’s
principle of definiteness.4 Next, a study of Pearl’s principle of reversibility will
be presented in order to support a suggested translation of this principle in
terms of the language of the Stalnaker-Lewis framework. Finally, as the trans-
lated principle is not valid in Stalnaker’s semantics, an extension of Stalnaker’s
logic incorporating the translated reversibility will be presented, and it will
be shown that this extended system is sound and complete with respect to a
modified Stalnaker’s semantics.
2.1. Similarity-based Theories of Counterfactuals
In the study of counterfactuals, David Lewis, indeed, is one of the most
crucial proponents for the adoption of possible-world semantics.5 Lewis has
different formulations of the truth condition of a counterfactual conditional,
and one of these from Lewis (1973c) is addressed as follows.
1See Lewis (1973b), Stalnaker (1968), and Stalnaker and Thomason (1970).
2See Bennett (1984), Jackson (1977), and Nute (1975, 1976).
3An notable example is Woodward (2003).
4Pearl has offered a comparison between his logic with Lewis’s logic. See Galles and Pearl
(1998) and Pearl (2009).
5For those who demand an investigation on the metaphysics of possible-world semantics, see
Lewis (1986b) for an in-depth discussion.
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Lewis’s truth-condition of counterfactual conditionals
A → C is true at [world] i iff C holds at every closest
(accessible) A-world to i, if any (1973c, p. 422).6
The “→” is a non-truth-functional connective denoting the counterfactual
conditional. Thus, A→ C is read as “if it were the case that A, C would be the
case”. A φ-world is a world in which φ is true. Similar to modal logic, whether a
world is accessible from a particular world depends on the accessibility relation
among possible worlds.7 Moreover, whether a world is closer to a particular
world than other worlds is determined by Lewis’s famous notion of comparative
similarity. We will revisit this notion following the explication of Lewis’s logic
of counterfactuals.
Lewis’s favorite formulation of his theory is stated with the help of the sys-
tems of spheres. However, in view of the comparative work later in this thesis,
this formulation is not as convenient as his reformulation in terms of selec-
tion functions, which is “the simplest and the most direct formulation” (1973b,
p. 57). Hereafter, Lewis’s formal semantics in terms of this reformulation will
be adopted in this thesis.8 A Lewisian model M is a tuple <W , I, f>,9 where
W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, I is an interpretation function which
maps each possible world in W to a truth assignment such that the truth of
a proposition P in a world w is denoted as Iw(P ) =T, and f is a selection
function over W which outputs a set of worlds after inputting a proposition
and a possible world. By following a similar labeling from Stalnaker (1968), the
inputted possible world, the inputted proposition, and the worlds in the out-
putted set are named the base world, the antecedent, and the selected world(s)
respectively.10 The selection function purports to pick out the set of the closest
antecedent-worlds (the selected worlds which have the antecedent true) relative
6This truth-condition is not Lewis’s “final analysis” among his discussed analyses in Lewis
(1973c). This version embodied the so-called limit assumption which assumes that there is
always a set of closest antecedent-worlds for any world i, given that the antecedent is not
impossible. It is not necessarily so, as Lewis argued, since it is possible to have closer and
closer antecedent-worlds without an end, and thus there is no such a set of closest antecedent-
worlds. See Lewis (1973b, pp. 19-20), and Lewis (1973c, pp. 424-425) for his final analysis.
Nevertheless, given my primary goal is to compare Pearl’s logic which characterizes causal
models which are finite models, forgoing the limit assumption will cause much inconvenience.
Hence, I will take a version of Lewis’s semantics with limit assumption in this thesis for a
more analogous comparison with Pearl’s framework, unless otherwise specified.
7Lewis (1973b, p. 78) noticed that the accessibility relation can be defined in terms of selection
function.
8The reformulation in terms of selection function assumes that there is a set of closest
antecedent-worlds given a possible counterfactual antecedent. This is the limit assumption
mentioned earlier. See footnote 6.
9I follow Halpern (2010) and Zhang (2011) of characterizing a Lewisian model where accessi-
bility is not included in the model-schema. See Lewis (1973c) for an original characterization.
10See Stalnaker (1968, p. 104). Notice that Stalnaker does not allow multiple selected worlds.
This point will be fully discussed in the following.
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to a base world. The set of closest worlds in which a formula φ is true relative
to a world w is selected by f(φ,w).
Let L be the language formed by starting with any propositional variable
and closing off under ⊃, ∼, and →. Other connectives (e.g. ∧, ∨, and ≡)
are defined as usual. Accordingly, the semantics of a formula in L is given as
follows. For any w ∈ W , any proposition P , and any formula φ, ψ ∈ L:
(M , w) |= P iff Iw(P ) = T;
(M , w) |= ∼φ iff Iw(φ) = F;
(M , w) |= φ ⊃ ψ iff Iw(φ) = F or Iw(ψ) = T;
(M , w) |= φ → ψ iff Iw′(ψ) = T for every w′ ∈ f(φ,w).
In addition, there are four conditions which should be satisfied by a (Lewisian)
selection function. For any w ∈ W , and any formula φ, ψ ∈ L:
(S1) If φ is true at w, then f(φ,w) = {w}.
(S2) φ is true at every world in f(φ,w).
(S3) If ψ is true at every world at which φ is true,
and f(φ,w) 6= Ø, then f(ψ,w) 6= Ø.
(S4) If ψ is true at every world at which φ is true,
and φ is true in some world in f(ψ,w), then f(φ,w)
contains all and only those worlds in f(ψ,w) at which φ
is true.11
(S1) requires that a world be always closer to itself than any other world. (S2)
demands the truth of the antecedent in the selected world. (S3) requires that if
a formula is impossible for a world, then any stronger formula is also impossible
for that world. Finally, (S4) is a condition aiming to guarantee a consistent
similarity measurement to a base world. In other words, it avoids the following
case: world w is closer to the base world than another world w′ relative to
an antecedent φ, but w is more distant to the base world than w′ relative to
another antecedent ψ. Let M be the class of models in which, for any M ∈M,
the selection function f in M fulfills the conditions (S1)-(S4).
Next, the logic of counterfactuals developed by Lewis (1973b, p. 132), namely
VC, will be investigated. The axiomatization of VC is as follows:
Rules of inference
(R1) Modus Ponens
(R2) If (ψ1 ∧...∧ ψn) ⊃ χ is a theorem, then
((φ → ψ1) ∧...∧ (φ → ψn)) ⊃ (φ → χ)
is a theorem.
11The formulation of (S1), (S2), (S3), (S4), and (SS) closely follows the formulation in Zhang
(2011). See Lewis (1973b, p. 58) for his original formulation.
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Axioms schemata
(VC0) All instances of truth-functional tautologies
(VC1) φ → φ
(VC2) (∼φ → φ) ⊃ (ψ → φ)
(VC3) (φ →∼ψ) ∨ (((φ∧ψ) → χ) ≡ (φ → (ψ⊃χ)))
(VC4) (φ → ψ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ)
(VC5) (φ ∧ ψ) ⊃ (φ → ψ)
The validity of (VC1) is grounded by (S2). (VC2) is validated by conditions
(S2) and (S3). (VC3) is guaranteed by (S4), and (S1) validates both (VC4)
and (VC5). Beyond Lewis’s work, another important logic of counterfactuals
(based on the similarity-based framework) is Stalnaker’s work in Stalnaker
(1968) and Stalnaker and Thomason (1970). The difference of Stalnaker’s logic
from Lewis’s VC is that Stalnaker requires that, given that the antecedent is
not impossible to the base world, there is one and only one world in the set of
closest possible worlds outputted by the selection function. This condition can
be captured by an additional condition of selection function (SS).
(SS) For any formula φ ∈ L, and any world w ∈ W , f(φ,w)
is a singleton set or  (i.e. an empty set).12
This condition correspondingly validates an axiom (S), which is the famous law
of conditional excluded middle.
(S) (φ → ψ) ∨ (φ → ∼ψ)
LetMS be a subclass ofM in which, for anyM ∈MS, the selection function f
in M fulfills the condition (SS), in addition to (S1)-(S4). Supplementing (S) to
VC then yields the Stalnaker’s logic in which Lewis denotes as VCS (Lewis,
1973b, p. 133).
(SS), indeed, is a condition that Lewis does not concede. To claim that
world w′ is closer to world w than world w′′, in Lewis’s theory, is to claim that
w′ is more similar to w than w′′. If the restriction of unique closest world
is imposed on the selection function, it implies that there cannot be a tie in
weighting comparative similarity, that is, two or more worlds are outputted by
the selection function. As Lewis put it, “(his truth condition) is the obvious
revision of Stalnaker’s analysis to permit a tie in comparative similarity between
several equally close closest A-worlds” (1973c, p. 422). The difference between
Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s can be made more explicit by an example due to Quine
(1950).
12Note that Stalnaker (1968) employs world-selection function rather than set-selection func-
tion, where an absurd world λ is included in the model schema playing the role of the empty
set.
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It is not the case that if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet
would be Italian; and it is not the case that if Bizet and Verdi
were compatriots, Bizet would not be Italian; nevertheless, if
Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet either would or would
not be Italian (1950, p. 14).
By symbolizing “Bizet and Verdi are compatriots” as P and “Bizet is Italian”
as Q, we have ∼(P → Q) ∧ ∼(P → ∼Q) ∧ (P → (Q ∨ ∼Q)). The third
conjunct is valid in both Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s semantics. It is the first two
conjuncts which are at stake. In Lewis’s aforementioned semantics, particularly
with regard to his analysis of overall similarity, he allows the case of two (or
more) possible worlds being closest to a base world. Given that Bizet and
Verdi are not compatriots in the actual world, it could be the case that they
are compatriots in both w1 and w2 which are both closest to the actual world,
where Bizet is an Italian in w1 but a French in w2. Hence, it is neither the
case that Bizet is an Italian in all worlds in the set of the closest compatriot-
with-Verdi-worlds, nor the case that Bizet is not an Italian in all these worlds.
Nevertheless, Stalnaker’s logic leaves no room of truth for the stated case.
Stalnaker does not allow the multiplicity of closest worlds according to his
condition (SS), and the first two conjuncts together immediately contradict
the axiom (S). Hence, the formula is contradictory in Stalnaker’s logic.13
In summary, the distinction between Lewis’s framework and Stalnaker’s
rests on the limitation of number of worlds in the set of the closest possible
worlds. Given that the set is non-empty, Lewis allows multiple worlds in the
set but Stalnaker allows at most one world. This distinction, as will be argued
very soon, shows that Stalnaker’s logic is more analogous to Pearl’s structure-
based logic than Lewis’s. The following section offers an overview of Pearl’s
framework.
2.2. Pearl’s Structure-based Theory of Counterfactuals
Unlike the similarity-based theories, Pearl’s theory offers a causal inter-
pretation of counterfactuals based on a modifiable structural equation model.
Putting it differently, articulating counterfactuals with causal models. Roughly
speaking, the truth of a counterfactual conditional depends on whether the
consequent is true under a hypothetical intervention that makes the antecedent
13I am not arguing that Stalnaker has imposed a wrong condition on selection function and
thus given assurance to an axiom which should never receive credentials. Whether VC or
VCS is more favorable is not at issue for the current purpose of reviewing them. For those
who are interested, see Stalnaker (1980) in defending the law of conditional excluded middle.
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true.14 This section will introduce the framework developed by Galles and Pearl
(1998) for the later comparative work.15
A signature S for causal models is a triple < U,V, R >16 where U and
V are finite sets of variables, and R restricts the range of values, which is a
finite set, taken by each variable X ∈ U ∪V. A causal model T is a tuple
<S, F > over a signature S where F is a collection of functions, such that for
each variable X∈V, there is a unique function fX :×Y ∈U∪V\{X}R(Y )→R(X).
In other words, the function maps each value configuration of U ∪ V\ {X}
to the value of X. Thus, the value of X ∈ V depends on the values of other
variables inside the causal models where fX characterizes the causal mechanism
of X. Note that for all U ∈ U, there is no function for U since its value is
determined outside the model. Therefore, a value configuration of U plays the
role of describing the context or background conditions for the causal model.
Naturally, U are called the set of exogenous variables whereas V are the set of
endogenous variables.
A causal model is also known as a structural equation model in the sense
that each fX corresponds to a structural equation: X= fX(U∪V\ {X}). Usu-
ally, for every variable X ∈ V, some variables in U ∪V\ {X} are redundant
in determining the value of X. They can then be omitted from the structural
equation for X and the set of remaining variables which contributes in deter-
mining the value of X are denoted as PAX (i.e. the parents of X). G(T ) is
a directed graph which represents the qualitative features of a causal model T
and it consists of nodes and directed edges in which the former corresponds to
variables in U ∪V and the latter points from members of PAX toward X.
Given a causal model T =< U,V, R, F >, a (possibly empty) subset of
endogenous variables X ⊆ V, and a possible value configuration x of X (i.e. x
contains one and only one value for each variable in X), a submodel TX=x de-
notes the causal model that results from T by replacing the structural equation
of X in T with X = x. So, excluding that for each X ∈ X that the equation
for X is modified into X = x (where x is the component value in x for X),
TX=x is the same as the original model T . The modeling which allows the
replacement of structural equations thus gains its name modifiable structural
equation models.
One of the common themes shared by different theories of counterfactuals
is how to capture the idea of minimal change, or how a hypothetical situation
14Not every theory of causal modeling interprets counterfactual conditionals with hypothet-
ical intervention. For instance, see Handfield et al. (2007) and Hiddleston (2005).
15In order to offer a more elegant and rigorous formalism, the modeling method offered by
Halpern (2000), Halpern (2010), and Zhang (2011) is adopted in this thesis.
16Bold letters are used to denote a (possibly empty) set.
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Figure 2.2.1
differs minimally from the actuality. In Pearl’s logic, the functions in F sym-
bolize independent physical mechanisms. To change minimally is to modify the
function(s) in question, for instance, replacing the functions of T with X = x
into TX=x. Intuitively, TX=x models the counterfactual situation in which X
is intervened to take the value x while the mechanisms for other endogenous
variables are kept intact.
Next, we are going to consider different classes of causal models. A solution
to a causal model, relative to a value configuration of u of the exogenous
variables U, is a value configuration v of the endogenous variables V such that
all structural equations in the model are simultaneously satisfied. Generally
speaking, there may or may not be a solution to a causal model relative to a
value configuration of the exogenous variables, and even when there are, there
may be more than one solution.
A model T having its signature S =<U,V, R> is said to have the property
of unique solution if and only if for every X ⊆ V, every value configuration x
of X, and every value configuration u of U, there is one and only one solution
to the model TX=x relative to u. This class of models which has this property
is referred as Tuniq(S). Moreover, Trec(S), a subclass of Tuniq(S), is the class
of models where there is a total ordering  over all variables in V, such that if
X  Y , then Y /∈ PAX . If T ∈ Trec(S), then T ∈ Tuniq(S). It is because of the
obvious fact that one can solve the variables in the order given by  . Galles
and Pearl (1998) refer this class of models as recursive models, or acyclic models.
If a model is recursive, then there is no feedback relation in the model. Finally,
Tall(S) refers to the class of all causal models.17 Here are some examples
concerning these different classes:
Example 2.2.1. A recursive model
T =< U,V, R, F >
U = {U},V = {X, Y }
R(U) = R(X) = R(Y ) = {0, 1}
X = U
Y = X
See G(T ) in Figure 2.2.1.
Example 2.2.2. A non-recursive model with unique solution
T =< U,V, R, F >
17Zhang (2011) has also considered a class of causal models which is a subclass of Tall(S)
but a superclass of Tuniq(S), which is shown to validate certain Lewisian properties of
counterfactuals. See Zhang (2011) for details.
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Figure 2.2.2
U = {U}, V = {X, Y }
R(U) = R(X) = R(Y ) = {0, 1}
X = U ∧ Y
Y = U ∨X
See G(T ) in Figure 2.2.2.
Example 2.2.3. A non-recursive model with multiple solutions
T =< U,V, R, F >
U = {U}, V = {X, Y }
R(U) = R(X) = R(Y ) = {0, 1}
X = U ∨ Y
Y = U ∨X
See G(T ) in Figure 2.2.2.
The model in Example 2.2.1 is a model in Trec(S) due to the total ordering
over the variables in V. Given that the exogenous variable U is set, the value
of the endogenous variables, X and Y , can be solved one by one by the order-
ing. When U = 0, the unique solution to the model is {U = 0, X = 0, Y = 0};
similarly, when U = 1, the unique solution is {U = 1, X = 1, Y = 1}. More-
over, in every submodel, there is also a unique solution. For instance, the
unique solution to the submodel TX=1 is {U = 1, X = 1, Y = 1} when U = 1,
and {U = 0, X = 1, Y = 1} is that of the unique solution when U = 0. On
the other hand, both the models in Example 2.2.2 and Example 2.2.3 are non-
recursive models or cyclic models (i.e. both models are not in Trec(S)). As
indicated by the two oppositely directed edges between X and Y in their re-
spective directed graph, a feedback relation holds between X and Y in both
examples. It is remarkable that the model in Example 2.2.2 is in Tuniq(S)
whereas Example 2.2.3 is not (despite their identical qualitative characteristics
shown in the directed graphs). In Example 2.2.2, for any value of U and every
submodel (including the original model T ), there is a unique solution. However,
in Example 2.2.3, when U = 0, T has two solutions: {U = 0, X = 0, Y = 0} and
{U = 0, X = 1, Y = 1}.
In addition, a basic counterfactual formula is of the form
[X1 = x1 ∧ ... ∧Xk = xk]φ, where X1, ..., Xk are distinct variables in V, and
φ is a Boolean combinations of formulas of the form Y (u) = y.18 It expresses
18This formulation is provided from Halpern (2000) and the notation of [ ] is obviously
borrowed from dynamic logic (e.g. Harel 1979). Moreover, it is questionable of how to
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the statement “if X1 were intervened to take value x1, . . . , and Xk were in-
tervened to take value xk, it would be the case that φ, relative to u”. This
formula is typically abbreviated as [X = x]φ (i.e. “if the variables in X were
intervened to take the value configuration x, then φ would be the case”) for
the sake of convenience. In the special case when X is empty, the formula
[X = x]φ is then written as [true]φ, or simply φ. The language which contains
all the Boolean combinations of the basic counterfactual formulas is hereafter
referred as LCC(S) where “CC” stands for causal counterfactuals.19
Given any causal model T over S, every formula in LCC(S) has a truth value.
By following Halpern (2000), for a basic counterfactual formula [X = x]φ, T |=
[X = x] (Y (u) = y) if Y takes the value y in all solutions to TX=x relative to
u.20 Next, the truth value of any arbitrary counterfactual formulas φ and ψ
(which is a Boolean combination of basic counterfactual formulas) is defined in
the usual way:
T |= φ ∧ ψ iff T |= φ and T |= ψ
T |=∼φ iff T 2 φ
A formula φ is valid with respect to a class of causal models T iff T |= φ for
all T ∈ T.
An example from Pearl (2009, p. 209) helps in illustrating how causal mod-
eling operates. Consider the following model T which describes a case of an
execution of a prisoner which takes places in a firing squad:
Example 2.2.4. Execution of a prisoner
T =< U,V, R, F >
U = {U}, V = {W,X, Y, Z}
R(U) = R(W ) = R(X) = R(Y ) = R(Z) = {0, 1}
X = U
Y = X
Z = X
W = Y ∨ Z
See G(T ) in Figure 2.2.3.
U denotes whether the court orders the execution of the prisoner; X denotes
whether the Captain on the squad gives a signal; Y denotes whether rifleman
1 shoots; Z denotes whether rifleman 2 shoots; and W denotes whether the
handle antecedents in disjunctive form. For a relevant discussion in the Stalnaker-Lewis
framework, see Ellis el al. (1977), Lewis (1977), and Loewer (1976).
19The name of the language is borrowed from Zhang (2011). Halpern (2000) has introduced
some other languages for causal modeling when comparing his semantics to the one developed
by Galles and Pearl (1998).
20In Halpern (2000), a duel notation 〈X = x〉φ is introduced and is defined as ∼[X = x]∼φ.
Thus, T |= 〈X=x〉 (Y (u)=y) if Y takes the value y in some solutions to the submodel TX=x
relative to u. Note that T |= [X = x]φ is tantamount to T |= 〈X = x〉φ when T ∈ Tuniq(S)
or T ∈ Trec(S), but not when T ∈ Tall(S).
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Figure 2.2.3
prisoner dies. Let the values 0 and 1 represent non-occurrence and occurrence
respectively. Suppose that the court orders the execution, that is, U = 1.
Consider the conditional: had the Captain not given a signal, the prisoner
would not have died. To express formally, the conditional becomes [X = 0] (W (1) =
0). To determine its truth value, we consider the model TX=0 relative to
U = 1 where every structural equation is the same as T except the equa-
tion for X is replaced as X = 0.21 The (unique) solution to the submodel
is {U = 1, X = 0, Y = 0, Z = 0,W = 0} and it indicates that W takes value
0 in this solution. Hence, the conditional is true in this model (i.e. T |=
[X = 0] (W (1) = 0)).
Consider another conditional: had rifleman 1 not shot, the prisoner would
not have died, formally speaking, [Y = 0] (W (1) = 0). To evaluate this condi-
tional, we consider the model TY=0 relative to U = 1 where every structural
equation is the same as T except the equation for Y is replaced as Y = 0. The
(unique) solution to the submodel is {U = 1, X = 1, Y = 0, Z = 1,W = 1} and
it indicates that W takes value 1 rather than 0 in this solution. Hence, the
conditional is false in this model (i.e. T 2 [Y = 0] (W (1) = 0)).
Next, the following examines different axiomatic systems provided by Halpern
(2000) which categorize different classes of causal models:
Rules of inference
(MP) Modus Ponens
Axioms
(C0) All instances of truth-functional tautologies
(C1) [Y=y] (X(u)=x)⊃ [Y=y] (X(u) 6=x′)
if x, x′ ∈ R(X), x 6= x′
(Equality)22
(C2)
∨
x∈R(X) [Y=y] (X(u)=x)
(Definiteness)
(C3) ([X=x] (W (u)=w) ∧ [X=x] (Y (u)=y))
⊃ [X=x∧W =w] (Y (u)=y)
(Composition)
21U = 1 is essential in evaluating the conditional. As Pearl puts, “the counterfactual con-
sequent must be evaluated under the same background conditions as those prevailing in the
actual world” (2009, p. 211).
22Originally, this axiom is named uniqueness in Galles and Pearl (1998).
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(C4) [X=x ∧W =w] (W (u)=w)
(Effectiveness)
(C5) ([X=x∧W =w] (Y (u)=y) ∧ [X=x∧Y =y] (W (u)=w))
⊃ [X=x] (Y (u)=y), if Y 6= W
(Reversibility)
(C1) states that there is at most one solution to a model. (C2), on the other
hand, states that there is at least one solution to a model. (C3) expresses the
idea that if the value of W is w in every solution to TX=x, then all solutions
to TX=x,W=w are the same as the solutions to TX=x. (C4) is simply that an
intervention is effective in the sense that W has the value assigned by the
intervention. Finally, (C5) says that, if Y takes the value y by forcing W to
the value w, and W takes the value w by forcing Y to the value y, then W and
Y will have the values w and y respectively without any intervention.
Beyond these five axioms, an extra axiom is needed to characterize the class
of recursive models. Particularly, the notation is helpful in axiomatizing the
logic for Trec(S) where Y  Z, read “Y affects Z”, is an abbreviation for the
formula:∨
X⊆V, x∈×X∈VR(X), ya∈R(Y ),u∈×U∈UR(U), zc 6=zd∈R(Z)
([X=x ∧ Y =ya](Z(u)=zc)∧[X=x](Z(u)=zd))
(Affect)
In plain words, this formula expresses the idea that the changed value of Y
alters the value of Z under certain setting of some variables, both exogenous
and endogenous. The extra axiom is then:
(C6) ((X0  X1) ∧ ... ∧ (Xk−1  Xk))
⊃∼(Xk  X0)
(Recursiveness)
Let AXuniq(S) consist of (C0)-(C5) and MP, and let AXrec(S) consist of (C0)-
(C4), (C6), and MP.23 Halpern (2000) showed that AXuniq(S) (AXrec(S)) is
a sound and complete axiomatization for LCC(S) with respect to Tuniq(S)
(Trec(S)).24
Indeed, many of the axioms are quite plausible intuitively, but reversibility
arguable is not. As Halpern (2000) indicated, the validity of reversibility in
Tuniq(S) is “non-obvious” (2000, p. 329). Neither is it clear how reversibility
23(C5) is not included in AXrec(S) since it can be deduced from (C3) and (C6). See Galles
and Pearl (1998) and Halpern (2000). In addition, see Halpern (2000) for a sound and
complete axiomatization to Tall(S).
24AXuniq(S)and AXrec(S) are actually not the sets of axioms Pearl used to characterize the
class of models with unique solutions and recursive models respectively. However, as pointed
out by Halpern (2000), the language employed by Pearl’s is inadequate in expressing certain
fundamental axioms like (C1) and (C2) (pp.324-325). Thus, this thesis takes Halpern’s result
as a refinement of Pearl’s logic and refers Pearl’s logic as this refined work.
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can relate the mentioned distinction between Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s logics.
These are the issues that will be addressed in the following section.
2.3. Reversibility and the Problem of Translation
Reversibility is not as intuitive as the other axioms in AXuniq(S). I now
reproduce the soundness proof of (C5) in Tuniq(S), which is provided by Galles
and Pearl (1998) and Halpern (2000).
Theorem 2.3.1. [Galles and Pearl, Halpern] (C5) is valid in Tuniq(S).
Proof. Let T ∈ Tuniq(S). Suppose that T |= [X=x ∧W =w]
(Y (u) = y)∧ T |= [X=x ∧ Y =y] (W (u) = w). I aim to show that T |=
[X=x] (Y (u) = y). Given that T is in Tuniq(S), every submodel of T has a
unique solution. Let v1 be the unique solution to the submodel TX=x,W=w (rel-
ative to u) and v2 be the unique solution to the submodel TX=x,Y=y (relative
to u). Consider the submodel TX=x,W=w,Y=y (relative to u). Note that for
any variable Z /∈ X ∪ {W,Y }, the equations for Z in TX=x,W=w, TX=x,Y=y,
and TX=x,W=w,Y=y are all the same, except that W is set to w in TX=x,W=w,
Y is set to y in TX=x,Y=y, and both W and Y are set to w and y respectively
in TX=x,W=w,Y=y. However, given that w and y are the values of W and Y
respectively in both v1 and v2, and both of these solutions satisfy the equa-
tions of Z in TX=x,W=w and TX=x,Y=y, thus v1 and v2 are both solutions to
the submodel TX=x,W=w,Y=y. Again, since every submodel of T has a unique
solution, v1 =v2. By then I need to show that v1 is the unique solution of TX=x
(relative to u). As shown above, v1 satisfies the equation for Z in TX=x, for
any Z /∈ X∪{W,Y }, and since v1 satisfies the equation for Y in TX=x,W=w, v1
satisfies the equation for Y in TX=x as well. Similarly, since v2 =v1 satisfies the
equation for W in TX=x,Y=y, v1 satisfies the equation for W in TX=x as well.
Given that TX=x has a unique solution, finally, as Y has the value y in v1, and
v1 is the solution to TX=x, hence T |= [X=x] (Y (u)=y) as desired. 
By considering reversibility with X = x being taken as empty, that is, no
intervention is taken other than W = w and Y = y in the antecedent of the
principle, a restricted form of reversibility follows:
(C5s) ([W=w](Y (u)=y)∧[Y=y](W (u)=w))⊃ Y (u)=y,
if Y 6= W (Restricted Reversibility)
A natural way of reading (C5s) is to view the actual state as an equilibrium state
attained by the mutual interdependence between two variables, for instance,
price and quantity in economics.25 As noticed by both Galles and Pearl (1998)
and Halpern (2000), reversibility follows from the property of unique solution.
25This reading is borrowed from Halpern (2000) when he explains the property of unique
solution.
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It is easy to see that reversibility is invalid in models with multiple solutions,
or with no solution. For instance, in Example 2.2.3, even if we have T |=
[X=1] (Y (0) = 1) and T |= [Y=1] (X(0) = 1), it is not the case that T |=
Y (0)=1.
The property of unique solution is expressed by equality and definiteness,
that is, (C1) and (C2). (C1) states that there is at most one solution to every
submodel, and (C2) states that there is at least one solution to every submodel.
Thus, they together imply that there is a unique solution to every submodel,
which is exactly what the property of unique solution states.
In order to clarify the issues of whether reversibility is valid in the similarity-
based theories, a more pressing inquiry is that of the property of unique solu-
tion. Nonetheless, such a mission cannot be done easily without a translation
method bridging up the languages of the two frameworks. The following is the
method provided by Galles and Pearl (1998, p. 15) for translating a counter-
factual conditional expressed in L into LCC(S):
Translation from L into LCC(S)
For any sets of variables X and Y, let φ and ψ stand for X = x
and Y = y respectively, then [X = x](Y (u) = y) ≡ φ→ ψ.26
Once the translation is available, the analysis as to whether equality and defi-
niteness are valid inM andMS can proceed. First, every variable in U∪V will
be specified as binary to assimilate the two-valuedness in the similarity-based
framework. Let φ and ψ stand for Y = y and X = x respectively.
(C1t) (φ → ψ) ⊃ ∼(φ → ∼ψ)
(Translated Equality)
(C2t) (φ → ψ) ∨ (φ → ∼ψ)
(Translated Definiteness)27
As Lewis (1973b, pp. 79-80) observed, (C1t) is valid in both Lewis’s and
Stalnaker’s semantics, except in a vacuous case that φ is an impossible an-
tecedent. Moreover, given that every hypothetical intervention is possible in
causal modeling, the vacuous case can then be ignored. However, (C2t), which
is exactly the axiom (S) of VCS, is valid only in Stalnaker’s semantics but not
Lewis’s.28
This result confirms the previous claim in this thesis that Stalnaker’s logic is
more analogous to Pearl’s than Lewis’s in light of the principle of definiteness.
26The value configuration u of the set of exogenous variables is not expressed in the similarity-
based language on the right hand side. But it is not necessary as long as u is kept constant
all the way through. Halpern (2010) has used a much more rigorous but complex way in
taking caring of the value configuration u in the similarity-based language.
27The translated (C2) and (C3) are both shown to be valid in the similarity-based semantics,
both Lewis’s and Stalnaker’s. See Galles and Pearl (1998) and Halpern (2010).
28A similar result is provided by Halpern (2010).
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The upcoming enquiry is whether reversibility is valid in Stalnaker’s logic.
Given that reversibility follows from the property of unique solution, and both
equality and definiteness are contained in Stalnaker’s framework, the answer
seems to be positive. Here is a preliminary translation of reversibility. Let φ,
ψ, and χ stand for X = x, Y = y and W = w respectively.
(C5t1) (((φ ∧ χ)→ ψ)∧((φ ∧ ψ)→ χ))⊃(φ→ ψ)
(Translated Reversibility - Version 1)
This version of translated reversibility has an obvious defect. By substituting φ
with any arbitrary formula, say P , and substituting both ψ and χ with the same
formula, say Q, it becomes (((P ∧Q)→ Q)∧((P ∧Q)→ Q))⊃ (P → Q).
Obviously, Q is always true in the closest (P∧Q)-world, but then it follows that
(P → Q) is true, that is, every counterfactual conditional will be true. Thus,
this version can hardly be a principle for this defect. However, substituting
both ψ and χ with the same formula is objectionable due to the supplementary
condition Y 6=W of (C5). Thus, an appropriate translation should capture the
distinctness of the two variables. An immediate suggestion is to emphasize the
idea that the value of a variable can be manipulated independently from the
value of another variable. In order words, every value combination of ψ and χ
is possible. For the sake of simplicity, a pair of modal operators will be defined
to facilitate the latter versions of translation.
Definition 2.3.2. Modal operators29
Let ⊥ stand for a sentential constant falsehood (e.g. φ∧ ∼φ).
For any formula φ ∈ L,
♦φ =df ∼(φ→⊥)
φ =df ∼φ→⊥
♦φ and φ represent “it is possible that φ” and “it is necessary that φ”
respectively. To express the idea that the variables at stake can be indepen-
dently manipulated, a putative suggested translation is to add as an antecedent
♦(ψ ∧ χ) ∧ ♦(ψ∧ ∼χ) ∧ ♦(∼ψ ∧ χ) ∧ ♦(∼ψ∧ ∼χ) to (C5t1). It results the
following:
(C5t2) (♦(ψ ∧ χ) ∧ ♦(ψ ∧∼χ) ∧ ♦(∼ψ ∧ χ) ∧ ♦(∼ψ ∧∼χ))
⊃ ((((φ ∧ χ)→ ψ)∧((φ ∧ ψ)→ χ))⊃(φ→ ψ))
(Translated Reversibility - Version 2)
This version evades the absurdity that every counterfactual conditional is true.
However, one may still argue that if ψ and χ are contradictory to each other,
(C5t2) becomes vacuously true due to the impossibility of (ψ∧χ). A rebuttal to
this claim is simple; since distinct variables can be independently manipulated,
29This definition is borrowed from Lewis. See Lewis (1973a, p. 22).
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it suggests that they cannot represent identical, overlapping, or even concep-
tually related events. The case in which ψ and χ are contradictory indeed
suggests that ψ and χ stand in a conceptual relation.
But (C5t2) is not immune to revision. A notable case is when φ is taken
as (∼ψ∧∼χ), that is, φ is inconsistent with ψ and also with χ. In this case,
(C5t2) becomes false even if the antecedent supplemented is satisfied.30 In
order to avoid this case, a stronger antecedent is needed in which φ has to be
involved in the precondition of distinctness.
(C5t3) (♦(φ ∧ ψ ∧ χ) ∧ ♦(φ ∧ ψ∧ ∼χ) ∧ ♦(φ∧ ∼ψ ∧ χ)∧
♦(φ∧ ∼ψ∧ ∼χ))⊃((((φ ∧ χ)→ ψ)∧((φ ∧ ψ)→ χ))
⊃ (φ→ ψ))
(Translated Reversibility - Version 3)
(C5t3) is my final analysis of translating (C5) into the language for similarity-
based theories. Unlike (C5t1), ψ and χ cannot be the same formula, and
unlike (C5t2), the possibility that φ is inconsistent with ψ and χ does not
falsify (C5t3). Nevertheless, this version is not valid in MS.
Example 2.3.3. Counter-model to (C5t3) in MS31
M = 〈W, I, f〉 ∈MS
W = {w1, w2, w3, w4, w5}
Iw1(P ) = T, Iw1(Q) = F, Iw1(R) = F,
Iw2(P ) = T, Iw2(Q) = T, Iw2(R) = T,
Iw3(P ) = T, Iw3(Q) = F , Iw3(R) = T,
Iw4(P ) = T, Iw4(Q) = T, Iw4(R) = F;
f(P,w1) = {w1}, f(P ∧Q,w1) = {w2}, f(P ∧R,w1) = {w2}.
Hence, after the trial of different translations on distinctness of variables, re-
versibility is not valid in Stalnaker’s semantics. Either there is a more refined
version of reversibility which is eventually valid in Stalnaker’s semantics, or
there is no better translation and reversibility always has counter-models. The
former option does not seem workable. Probably, it is the special feature of
structural equation models which contributes to the validity of the principle of
reversibility under the property of unique solution. In other words, the property
of unique closest world in Stalnaker’s semantics is weaker than the property of
unique solution in causal modeling. It is interesting, then, to consider extending
Stalnaker’s logic by embedding the principle of reversibility.
30As φ is inconsistent with χ, ((φ ∧ χ)→ ψ) is vacuously true. Similarly, the inconsistency
between φ and ψ results the vacuous truth of ((φ∧ψ)→ χ) and also the falsity of (φ→ ψ).
Hence, even if the antecedent supplemented is satisfied, (C5t2) is false in this case.
31I have not specified the selection function for the base worlds other than w1 and also
formulas other than those at stake. These details are not essential for the current purpose of
falsifying (C5t3) in Stalnaker’s semantics.
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2.4. Incorporating Reversibility in Stalnaker’s Logic - VCSR
In this section, a soundness and completeness proof of a new axiomatic
system, which is resulted from VCS and (C5t3), to a strengthened Stalnaker’s
semantics will be provided (with respect to L). Let VCSR be the axiomatic
system supplementing (C5t3) to VCS. Before exploring the strengthened se-
mantics, a definition of distinctness of formulas will help in capturing the dis-
tinctness of variables discussed in the last section.
Definition 2.4.1. Distinctness of formulas
Relative to a model M = 〈W, I, f〉, any two formulas ψ, χ ∈ L are distinct
relative to a formula φ ∈ L in w ∈ W iff Iw(♦(φ∧ψ ∧ χ)) = Iw(♦(φ ∧ ψ ∧
∼χ)) = Iw(♦(φ∧ ∼ψ ∧ χ)) = Iw(♦(φ∧∼ψ ∧ ∼χ)) = T.
Next, in order to validate (C5t3), an additional condition will be supplemented
into the selection function f .
(SR) For any formula φ, ψ, χ ∈ L and any world w,w′,w′′, w′′′ ∈ W ,
if ψ and χ are distinct relative to φ in w, then if Iw′(χ) =
Iw′′(ψ) = T for every w′ ∈ f(φ ∧ ψ,w) and w′′ ∈ f(φ ∧ χ,w),
then Iw′′′(ψ) = T for every w′′′ ∈ f(φ,w).
Let MSR be a subclass of MS in which, for any M ∈ MSR, the selection
function f in M fulfills the conditions (S1)-(S4), (SS) and (SR).
Theorem 2.4.2. VCSR is a sound axiomatization for L with respect to
MSR.
Proof. Lewis (1973a) has proven that VCS is a sound axiomatization for
L with respect to MS. Thus, it suffices to provide the validity of (C5t3) in
MSR. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that (C5t3) is not valid in MSR.
It means that there is a model M ∈ MSR where M = 〈W, I, f〉 , in which
there is a world w ∈ W such that ♦(φ ∧ ψ ∧ χ) ∧ ♦(φ ∧ ψ∧ ∼χ) ∧ ♦(φ∧ ∼
ψ ∧ χ)∧♦(φ∧ ∼ ψ∧ ∼χ) and (((φ ∧ χ)→ ψ)∧ ((φ ∧ ψ)→ χ)) are true
in w, but (φ→ ψ) is false in w. According to Definition 2.4.1, the former
entails that ψ and χ are distinct relative to φ in w. It then implies that
f(φ ∧ ψ ∧ χ,w), f(φ ∧ ψ∧ ∼χ,w), f(φ∧ ∼ ψ ∧ χ,w), f(φ∧ ∼ ψ∧ ∼ χ,w) are
non-empty sets, so are f(φ ∧ ψ,w), f(φ ∧ χ,w), and f(φ,w). From (SS), they
are all singleton sets. From the truth of (((φ ∧ χ)→ ψ)∧((φ ∧ ψ)→ χ)) in
w, Iw′(ψ) = T and Iw′′(χ) = T for any w′ ∈ f(φ ∧ ψ,w) and w′′ ∈ f(φ ∧ χ,w).
Similarly, Iw′′′(ψ) = F for any w′′′ ∈ f(φ,w) follows from the falsity of (φ→ψ)
in w. However, a contradiction arises with Iw′′′(ψ) = T which follows from (SR)
and the above. Hence, there is no such model M and (C5t3) is therefore valid
in MSR. 
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Next, the completeness proof will be demonstrated by following the standard
strategy of employing canonical models.32
Definition 2.4.3. VCSR-consistency
A set of formulas Γ in L is said to beVCSR-consistent, or simply consistent,
iff there is no {φ1, ..., φn} ⊆ Γ such that `VCSR∼(φ1∧ ... ∧ φn).
Definition 2.4.4. Maximal consistency
A set of formulas Γ in L is said to be maximally consistent iff Γ is consistent
and for any formula φ ∈L, either φ ∈ Γ or ∼φ ∈ Γ.
Lemma 2.4.5. Let Γ be any maximally consistent set of formulas in L.
The following holds for any formula φ, ψ ∈ L:
2.4.5.1 φ ∈ Γ iff ∼φ /∈ Γ.
2.4.5.2 φ ∨ ψ ∈ Γ iff either φ ∈ Γ or ψ ∈ Γ.
2.4.5.3 φ ∧ ψ ∈ Γ iff φ ∈ Γ and ψ ∈ Γ.
2.4.5.4 If `VCSR φ, then φ ∈ Γ.
2.4.5.5 If φ ∈ Γ and `VCSR φ ⊃ ψ, then ψ ∈ Γ.
2.4.5.6 If φ ∈ Γ and φ ⊃ ψ ∈ Γ, then ψ ∈ Γ.
2.4.5.7 If φ ∈ Γ and φ ≡ ψ ∈ Γ, then ψ ∈ Γ.
2.4.5.8 If ∼φ ∈ Γ and φ ≡ ψ ∈ Γ, then ∼ψ ∈ Γ.
Proof. Obvious from the definition of maximal consistency. See Hughes
and Cresswell (1996, p. 114). 
Lemma 2.4.6. Lindenbaum’s Lemma
Every consistent set of formulas in L can be extended to a
maximally consistent set.
Proof. By the standard construction. See Hughes and Cresswell (1996,
pp. 115-116). 
Definition 2.4.7. Canonical model
The canonical model M is a tuple 〈W, I, f〉 such that
2.4.7.1 W = {w : w is a maximally consistent set of formulas inL};
i.e. W is the set containing all and only maximally consistent sets
of formulas in L.
2.4.7.2 For any w ∈ W and any propositional variable P ,
Iw(P )=T iff P ∈ W .
2.4.7.3 For any w ∈ W and any formula φ ∈ L,
S(φ,w) = {ψ : (φ→ ψ) ∈ w}.
32For a textbook demonstration of this strategy, see e.g. Hughes and Cresswell (1996, ch. 6).
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2.4.7.4 For any w ∈ W and any formula φ ∈ L,
f(φ,w) =
{S(φ,w)} if S(φ,w) is consistent, otherwise.
To prove that f is indeed a selection function, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4.8. S(φ,w) is either a maximally consistent set of formulas or
a set containing every formula in L.
Proof. S(φ,w) is a set of formulas which is either consistent or inconsis-
tent. Suppose that it is consistent. Since w is a maximally consistent set accord-
ing to Definition 2.4.7.1, from the axiom schema (S) (i.e. `VCSR (φ→ ψ)∨
(φ→∼ψ)), Lemma 2.4.5.4 and Lemma 2.4.5.2, either (φ→ ψ) ∈ w or (φ→∼
ψ) ∈ w, for any formula φ, ψ ∈ L. By Definition 2.4.7.3, either ψ ∈ S(φ,w) or
∼ψ ∈ S(φ,w). Therefore, S(φ,w) is maximal according to Definition 2.4.4
and thus maximally consistent. On the other hand, suppose that S(φ,w) is
an inconsistent set of formulas. From Definition 2.4.3, there is a set of for-
mulas {ψ1, ..., ψn} ⊆ S(φ,w) such that `VCSR∼(ψ1∧ ...∧ψn). It entails that
for any χ ∈ L, `VCSR (ψ1∧ ...∧ψn) ⊃ χ. It follows from (R2) that `VCSR
((φ → ψ1) ∧...∧ (φ → ψn)) ⊃ (φ → χ). From {ψ1, ..., ψn} ⊆ S(φ,w), it
follows from Definition 2.4.7.3 and Lemma 2.4.5.3 that ((φ → ψ1) ∧...∧ (φ
→ ψn)) ∈ w. It then entails from Lemma 2.4.5.6 that (φ → χ) ∈ w. From
Definition 2.4.7.3, it entails that χ ∈ S(φ,w) for any χ ∈ L. Hence S(φ,w) is
either a maximally consistent set of formulas or an inconsistent set of formulas
which contains every formula in L. 
Lemma 2.4.9. In the canonical model, for any w ∈ W and any formula
φ ∈ L, f(φ,w) is either a subset of W or .
Proof. The lemma easily follows from Lemma 2.4.8 and Definition 2.4.7.4.

The next lemma aims to show that, according to the semantical rules in
Stalnaker’s semantics, a formula is true in a world in the canonical model if
and only if the formula belongs to that world.
Lemma 2.4.10. In the canonical model, for any w ∈ W and any formula
φ ∈ L, Iw(φ)=T iff φ ∈ w.
Proof. We prove the lemma by structural induction. The base case fol-
lows from Definition 2.4.7.2. For the inductive step, we prove the following:
(a) If the lemma holds for φ, it also holds for ∼φ.
(b) If the lemma holds for φ and ψ, it also holds for φ ⊃ ψ.
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(c) If the lemma holds for φ and ψ, it also holds for φ→ ψ.
PROOF (a): Consider a formula ∼φ ∈ L and any w ∈ W . Iw(∼φ) = T iff
Iw(φ)=F . Suppose that the lemma holds for φ. Iw(φ)=F iff φ /∈ w. It follows
from Definition 2.4.4 that Iw(∼φ)=T iff ∼φ ∈ w.
PROOF (b): Consider a formula (φ ⊃ ψ) ∈ L and any w ∈ W . Iw(φ ⊃
ψ) = T iff Iw(φ) = F or Iw(ψ) = T. Suppose that the lemma holds for φ and
ψ. Iw(φ ⊃ ψ) = T iff φ /∈ w or ψ ∈ w. From Definition 2.4.4 and φ /∈ w,
it follows that ∼ φ ∈ w. Thus, Iw(φ ⊃ ψ) = T iff ∼ φ ∈ w or ψ ∈ w. From
Lemma 2.4.5.2, Iw(φ ⊃ ψ)=T iff ∼φ∨ψ ∈ w. Hence, by the standard definition
of ⊃, Iw(φ ⊃ ψ)=T iff φ ⊃ ψ ∈ w.
PROOF (c): Consider a formula (φ→ ψ) ∈ L and any w ∈ W . Iw(φ→
ψ) = T iff Iw′(ψ) = T for any w′ ∈ f(φ,w). Suppose that the lemma holds for
φ and ψ.
[Only if] Suppose that Iw(φ→ ψ) = T. It follows that Iw′(ψ) = T for any
w′ ∈ f(φ,w). Since that lemma holds for ψ, it entails that ψ ∈ w′ for any w′ ∈
f(φ,w). Further suppose that S(φ,w) is consistent. From Definition 2.4.7.4,
it entails that ψ ∈ S(φ,w). It follows from Definition 2.4.7.3 that (φ→
ψ) ∈ w. Suppose that S(φ,w) is inconsistent. From Definition 2.4.3, there
is a set of formulas {χ1, ..., χn} ⊆ S(φ,w) such that `VCSR∼(χ1∧ ...∧χn). It
implies that `VCSR (χ1∧ ...∧χn) ⊃ ψ. From (R2), it follows that `VCSR ((φ
→ χ1) ∧...∧ (φ → χn)) ⊃ (φ → ψ). From {χ1, ..., χn} ⊆ S(φ,w), it
follows from Definition 2.4.7.3 and Lemma 2.4.5.3 that ((φ → χ1) ∧...∧ (φ
→ χn)) ∈ w. By Lemma 2.4.5.5, (φ → ψ) ∈ w.
[If] Suppose that (φ → ψ) ∈ w. It follows from Definition 2.4.7.3 that
ψ ∈ S(φ,w). Suppose that S(φ,w) is consistent. From Definition 2.4.7.4, it
entails that ψ ∈ w′ for any w′ ∈ f(φ,w). Since the lemma holds for ψ, it follows
that Iw′(ψ) = T for any w′ ∈ f(φ,w), and thus Iw(φ→ ψ) = T. If S(φ,w)
is inconsistent, it follows from Definition 2.4.7.4 that f(φ,w) = . Then
Iw′(ψ)=T for any w′ ∈ f(φ,w) follows trivially, and thus Iw(φ→ ψ)=T. 
Next, I prove that the f in the canonical model satisfies the constraints on
the selection function, i.e. (S1)-(S4), (SS) and (SR). I show them one by one.
Lemma 2.4.11. f in the canonical model fulfills (S1)
For every w ∈ W and any formula φ ∈ L, if φ is true at w, then
f(φ,w) = {w} .
Proof. Suppose that φ is true at w, that is, Iw(φ) =T. It follows from
Lemma 2.4.10 that φ ∈ w. To start with, I prove the following two claims: (1) for
any formula ψ ∈ S(φ,w), ψ ∈ w; and (2) for any formula ψ ∈ w, ψ ∈ S(φ,w).
First, Definition 2.4.7.3, for any ψ ∈ S(φ,w), (φ → ψ) ∈ w. From (VC4)
(i.e. `VCSR ((φ → ψ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ)), φ ∈ w, Lemma 2.4.5.5 and Lemma 2.4.5.6,
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ψ ∈ w. Hence, (1) is proven. Secondly, for any formula ψ ∈ w, since φ ∈ w, it
follows from Lemma 2.4.5.3 that (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ w. From (VC5) (i.e. `VCSR ((φ ∧
ψ) ⊃ (φ → ψ)), and Lemma 2.4.5.5, (φ → ψ) ∈ w. By Definition 2.4.7.3,
it follows that ψ ∈ S(φ,w) and thus (2) is proven. From (1) and (2), it
entails that S(φ,w) = w. Since w is a maximally consistent set, S(φ,w) = w
is consistent. From Definition 2.4.7.4, it follows that f(φ,w) = {S(φ,w)}.
Hence, f(φ,w) = {w} . 
Lemma 2.4.12. f in the canonical model fulfills (S2)
For every w ∈ W and any formula φ ∈ L, φ is true at every
world in f(φ,w).
Proof. From (VC1) (i.e. `VCSR(φ → φ)), by Definition 2.4.7.3 and
Lemma 2.4.5.4, it follows that φ ∈ S(φ,w). Suppose that S(φ,w) is consis-
tent. It then follows from Definition 2.4.7.4 that f(φ,w) ={S(φ,w)}. From
Lemma 2.4.10, Iw′(φ) = T for any w′ ∈ f(φ,w). Hence, φ is true at ev-
ery world in f(φ,w). Suppose that S(φ,w) is inconsistent. It follows from
Definition 2.4.7.4 that f(φ,w) = . Thus, φ is true at every in world in
f(φ,w) vacuously. 
Lemma 2.4.13. f in the canonical model fulfills (S3)
For every w ∈ W and any formula φ, ψ ∈ L, if ψ is true at
every world at which φ is true, and f(φ,w) 6= , then f(ψ,w) 6= .
Proof. Suppose that ψ is true at every world φ is true. It suffices to
prove that if f(ψ,w) = , then f(φ,w) = . So, suppose that f(ψ,w) =
. It follows from Definition 2.4.7.4 that S(ψ,w) is inconsistent. From
Lemma 2.4.8, S(ψ,w) contrains all formulas in L, including ∼ψ. It then follows
that (ψ → ∼ψ) ∈ w by Definition 2.4.7.3. From (VC2) (i.e. `VCSR(ψ →
∼ ψ)⊃ (φ → ∼ ψ)), it entails by that Lemma 2.4.5.5 that (φ → ∼ ψ) ∈ w.
From Definition 2.4.7.3, ∼ψ ∈ S(φ,w). By reductio, suppose that S(φ,w) is
consistent. It follows from Definition 2.4.7.4 that f(φ,w)={S(φ,w)}. From
Lemma 2.4.12, φ is true at every world in f(φ,w). Thus, φ is true at S(φ,w).
However, since ψ is true at every world φ is true, it follows from Lemma 2.4.10
that ψ ∈ S(φ,w). ψ ∈ S(φ,w) and ∼ψ ∈ S(φ,w) together entail that S(φ,w)
is not maximally consistent. From Lemma 2.4.8, S(φ,w) is an inconsistent set
of formulas. Hence, by Definition 2.4.7.4, f(φ,w)=. 
The proof of (SS) will be provided before that of (S4) for a more convenient
proof of the latter.
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Lemma 2.4.14. f in the canonical model fulfills (SS)
For every w ∈ W and any formula φ ∈ L, f(φ,w) is a singleton set or .
Proof. The lemma trivially follows from Definition 2.4.7.3 and
Definition 2.4.7.4. 
Lemma 2.4.15. f in the canonical model fulfills (S4)
For every w ∈ W and any formula φ, ψ ∈ L, if ψ is true at every world
φ is true, and φ is true in some world in f(ψ,w), then f(φ,w) consists
all and only those worlds in f(ψ,w) at which φ is true.
Proof. Suppose that ψ is true at every world φ is true. Further suppose
that φ is true in some world in f(ψ,w). From Lemma 2.4.14, f(ψ,w) 6= 
and Iw′(φ) =T where {w′} = {S(ψ,w)} = f(ψ,w). From Lemma 2.4.10 and
Definition 2.4.7.3, φ ∈ S(ψ,w) and (ψ → φ) ∈ w. Suppose that (ψ →
∼φ) ∈ w. It follows from Definition 2.4.7.3 that∼ψ ∈ S(ψ,w) and it violates
the fact that w′=S(ψ,w) is maximally consistent. Thus, (ψ → φ) /∈ w and
so ∼(ψ → φ) ∈ w by Lemma 2.4.5.1.
It would be useful to derive the following claims first. Here are two instances
of (VC3): `VCSR(ψ →∼φ) ∨ (((φ∧ψ) → χ) ≡ (ψ → (φ⊃χ))) and `VCSR(ψ
→∼ φ) ∨ (((φ∧ψ) → ∼ χ) ≡ (ψ → (φ⊃∼ χ))). From Lemma 2.4.5.4,
Lemma 2.4.5.2 and ∼ (ψ → φ) ∈ w, we have (i) (((φ∧ψ) → χ) ≡ (ψ →
(φ⊃χ))) ∈ w and (ii) (((φ∧ψ) → ∼χ) ≡ (ψ → (φ⊃∼χ))) ∈ w.
The fulfillment of (S4) of f can be proven by following four claims: (1) if
f(φ,w) = , then f(ψ,w) = ; (2) if f(ψ,w) = , then f(φ,w) = ; (3) for
any formula χ ∈ L, if χ ∈ S(φ,w), then χ ∈ S(ψ,w); and (4) for any formula
χ ∈ L, if χ ∈ S(ψ,w), then χ ∈ S(φ,w). Note that (3) and (4) are needed
instead of the claim “f(φ,w) consists all and only those worlds in f(ψ,w) at
which φ is true” due to Lemma 2.4.14 and the supposition that φ is true in every
world in f(ψ,w). (2) has been proven by f(ψ,w) 6= .
To prove (1), suppose that f(φ,w)=. From Definition 2.4.7.4, S{φ,w)
is an inconsistent set of formulas which contains every formula in L, including
∼ψ. It follows from Lemma 2.4.10 that Iw′′(ψ)= F for any w′′ ∈ f(φ,w). From
Lemma 2.4.12, φ is true in every world in f(φ,w). Then, a contradiction arises
from the supposition that ψ is true at every world φ is true. Hence, f(φ,w) 6= 
and (1) is proven.
Before proving (3) and (4), by reductio, suppose that (φ → ∼ ψ) ∈ w.
From Definition 2.4.7.3, ∼ ψ ∈ S(φ,w). Given that f(φ,w) 6= , from
Definition 2.4.7.4 and Lemma 2.4.10, Iw′′(ψ) = F for any w′′ ∈ f(φ,w). How-
ever, as it follows from Lemma 2.4.12 that φ is true in every world in f(φ,w), a
contradiction arises with the initial supposition that ψ is true at every world φ
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is true. Hence, (φ → ∼ψ) /∈ w and so ∼ (φ → ∼ψ) ∈ w by Lemma 2.4.5.1.
From an instance of (VC3) that `VCSR(φ →∼ψ) ∨ (((φ∧ψ) → χ) ≡ (φ →
(ψ⊃χ))), Lemma 2.4.5.4 and Lemma 2.4.5.2, either (φ → ∼ψ) ∈ w or (((φ∧ψ)
→ χ) ≡ (φ → (ψ⊃χ))) ∈ w. From ∼ (φ → ∼ψ) ∈ w, it follows that (iii)
(((φ∧ψ) → χ) ≡ (φ → (ψ⊃χ))) ∈ w.
I claim that f(ψ,w) = f(φ ∧ ψ,w). By reductio, suppose that there is a
formula χ ∈ L such that either χ ∈ S(ψ,w) and χ /∈ S(φ∧ψ,w), or χ ∈ S(φ∧
ψ,w) and χ /∈ S(ψ,w). First, suppose that χ ∈ S(ψ,w) and χ /∈ S(φ ∧ ψ,w).
If S(φ ∧ ψ,w) is an inconsistent set of formulas, by Lemma 2.4.8, any formulas
in L is in S(φ ∧ ψ,w), including χ which contradicts χ /∈ S(φ ∧ ψ,w). Thus,
S(φ ∧ ψ,w) is consistent (and thus maximally consistent by Lemma 2.4.8) and
∼χ ∈ S(φ∧ψ,w) follows from Lemma 2.4.5.1. It entails from Definition 2.4.7.3
that ((φ∧ψ) → ∼χ) ∈ w. From (ii) and Lemma 2.4.5.7, it follows that (ψ
→ (φ⊃∼ χ)) ∈ w. By Definition 2.4.7.3, (φ ⊃∼ χ) ∈ S(ψ,w). From
φ ∈ S(ψ,w) and Lemma 2.4.5.6, ∼χ ∈ S(ψ,w). Since S(ψ,w) = w′ which
is maximally consistent, a contradiction arises from χ ∈ S(ψ,w) and ∼ χ ∈
S(ψ,w). Therefore, it entails from the supposition that χ ∈ S(φ ∧ ψ,w) and
χ /∈ S(ψ,w). It follows from S(ψ,w) = w′ and Lemma 2.4.5.1 that ∼ χ ∈
S(ψ,w), which further derives that (φ ⊃∼χ) ∈ S(ψ,w). Thus, (ψ→ (φ ⊃∼
χ)) ∈ w follows from Definition 2.4.7.3. From (ii) and Lemma 2.4.5.7, ((φ∧ψ)
→ ∼ χ) ∈ w follows. By Definition 2.4.7.3 again, ∼χ ∈ S(φ ∧ ψ,w) is
entailed. Then, S(φ ∧ ψ,w) is not maximally consistent. By Lemma 2.4.8 and
Definition 2.4.7.4, f(φ∧ψ,w)= and Iw((φ∧ψ)→ χ)=T follows vacuously.
From Lemma 2.4.5.3, ∼ χ ∈ S(ψ,w) and φ ∈ S(ψ,w), (φ∧ ∼χ) ∈ S(ψ,w),
equivalently, (φ ⊃ χ) /∈ S(ψ,w). It follows from Definition 2.4.7.3 that
∼ (ψ→ (φ ⊃ χ)) ∈ w. From Lemma 2.4.5.8 and (i), ∼ ((φ∧ψ) → χ) ∈ w
follows. By Lemma 2.4.8, Iw((φ∧ψ)→ χ)=F and contradiction arises. Hence,
S(ψ,w)=S(φ ∧ ψ,w)=w′ and thus f(ψ,w)=f(φ ∧ ψ,w).
To prove (3), suppose that χ ∈ S(φ,w) for any χ ∈ L. From S(φ,w) 6= 
and Definition 2.4.7.4, Iw′′(χ) =T for any w′′ ∈ f(φ,w). It follows that
Iw′′(ψ ⊃ χ)=T for any w′′ ∈ f(φ,w). By Lemma 2.4.10 and Definition 2.4.7.3,
(φ → (ψ⊃χ)) ∈ w. From Lemma 2.4.5.7 and (iii), ((φ∧ψ) → χ) ∈ w.
By Definition 2.4.7.3, χ ∈ S(φ ∧ ψ,w). Given that S(ψ,w) = S(φ ∧ ψ,w),
χ ∈ S(ψ,w).
To prove (4), suppose that χ ∈ S(ψ,w) for any χ ∈ L. Given that
S(ψ,w) = S(φ ∧ ψ,w), χ ∈ S(φ ∧ ψ,w). From Definition 2.4.7.3, ((φ∧ψ)
→ χ) ∈ w. From (iii) and Lemma 2.4.5.7, (φ → (ψ⊃χ)) ∈ w follows. From
Definition 2.4.7.3, (ψ⊃χ)∈ S(φ,w). Since ψ is true at every world φ is true,
given that φ is true in S(φ,w) by Lemma 2.4.12, it follows from Lemma 2.4.10
that ψ ∈ S(φ,w). Finally, from Lemma 2.4.5.6, we have χ ∈ S(φ,w). 
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Lemma 2.4.16. f in the canonical model fulfills (SR)
For any formula φ, ψ, χ ∈ L and any world w,w′,w′′, w′′′ ∈ W , if ψ and χ
are distinct relative φ in w, then if Iw′(χ) = Iw′′(ψ) = T for every
w′ ∈ f(φ ∧ ψ,w) and w′′ ∈ f(φ ∧ χ,w), then Iw′′′(ψ) = T for every
w′′′ ∈ f(φ,w).
Proof. Suppose that ψ and χ are distinct relative φ in w. It follows from
Definition 2.4.1 that Iw(♦(φ∧ψ ∧ χ)) = Iw(♦(φ ∧ ψ∧ ∼χ)) = Iw(♦(φ∧ ∼
ψ ∧ χ))=Iw(♦(φ∧∼ψ ∧ ∼χ))=T. By Lemma 2.4.5.3 and Lemma 2.4.10, (♦(φ ∧
ψ∧χ)∧♦(φ∧ψ∧ ∼χ)∧♦(φ∧ ∼ψ∧χ)∧♦(φ∧ ∼ψ ∧ ∼χ)) ∈ w. Further suppose
that if Iw′(ψ) = Iw′′(χ) = T for any w′ ∈ f(φ ∧ ψ,w) and w′′ ∈ f(φ ∧ χ,w).
From Iw′′(χ)=T for any w′ ∈ f(φ∧ψ,w), it follows that Iw((φ∧ψ)→ χ)=T.
It then follows from Lemma 2.4.10 that ((φ∧ψ) → χ) ∈ w. Similarly, ((φ∧χ)
→ ψ) ∈ w follows from Iw′(ψ) =T for any w′′ ∈ f(φ ∧ χ,w). From (C5t3)
and Lemma 2.4.5.5, it follows that (φ→ ψ) ∈ w. By Definition 2.4.7.3 and
Lemma 2.4.10, Iw′′′(ψ)=T for any w′′′ ∈ f(φ,w). 
Lemma 2.4.17. The canonical model is a model in MSR.
Proof. This lemma follows from Lemma 2.4.11 - Lemma 2.4.16. 
Theorem 2.4.18. VCSR is a complete axiomatization for L with respect to
MSR.
Proof. Suppose that φ is true in all M = 〈W, I, f〉 ∈ MSR. I show that
`VCSR φ. For reductio, suppose that it is not the case that `VCSR φ. From
Definition 2.4.3, ∼ φ is VCSR-consistent. By Definition 2.4.7.1 and
Lemma 2.4.6, {∼φ} can be extended to a maximally consistent set w ∈ W .
By Lemma 2.4.10 and Lemma 2.4.17, there is a M ∈ MSR such that ∼φ is true
at w. It would then be a counter-model to φ, which contradicts the initial
supposition that φ is true in all M ∈MSR. Hence, `VCSR φ. 
To sum up this section, it is proposed that (C5t3) is an appropriate trans-
lation of reversibility and it is embedded into VCS which results an axiomatic
system named VCSR. This system is shown to be sound and complete with
respect to a new class of models MSR, which has a new constraint (SR) in the
selection function. An interesting property of this system will be proven in the
next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
Pearl’s Reversibility and the Irreversibility of
Counterfactual Dependence
In his seminal paper “Causation”, Lewis made famous the notion of coun-
terfactual dependence and argued that counterfactual dependence between two
distinct events is usually not reversible. In a joint work (Zhang et al. 2012),
Zhang, de Clercq, and I showed that a special case of Pearl’s reversibility en-
tails, and is entailed by, the irreversibility of counterfactual dependence. We
also showed that Pearl’s semantics rules out only mutual counterfactual de-
pendence, but not cyclic dependence in general. In this chapter, I present two
main results. One is a generalization of the result in Zhang et al. (2012), in
which I show that the full principle of reversibility is equivalent to a sort of
irreversibility of a generalized notion of counterfactual dependence. The second
is motivated by the peculiar fact that Pearl’s logic rules out mutual counterfac-
tual dependence but not cyclic counterfactual dependence in general. I show
that the logic developed in the previous chapter rules out cyclic counterfactual
dependence in general. In other words, although Stalnaker’s logic allows mu-
tual as well as cyclic counterfactual dependence, adding a principle that forbids
mutual counterfactual dependence (i.e. the principle of reversibility) into the
logic suffices to rule out cyclic counterfactual dependence in general.
3.1. Counterfactual Dependence and its Irreversibility
In his seminal work “Causation”, Lewis (1973a) offered a reductive anal-
ysis of causal dependence between two distinct families of events in terms of
counterfactual dependence. For any event C, let O(C) represents the propo-
sition that is true if and only if C occurs. Let c0, c1, . . . , cn and e0, e1, . . . , en
be distinct (possible) events such that no two of the c’s and no two of the
e’s are compossible. A family of events E = {e0, e1, . . . , en} counterfactually
depends on a family of events C = {c0, c1, . . . , cn} iff the counterfactual condi-
tionals: O(c0)→O(e0), O(c1)→O(e1), ..., O(cn)→O(en) are all true. For
the sake of simplicity, I usually restrict my consideration to families of events
with exactly two members in this thesis and call them binary family of events,
except for the generalizations stated later in section 3.2. The two members
in a binary family represents the occurrence and non-occurrence of an event.
For instance, a binary family of events E = {e0, e1} counterfactually depends
upon a binary family of events C = {c0, c1} iff the counterfactual conditionals
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O(C)→O(E) and ∼O(C)→∼O(E) are both true, where c0 represents the
non-occurrence of C and c1 represents the occurrence of C, in which ∼O(C)
and O(C) are propositions denoting the former and the latter respectively,
similarly for E.
As Lewis (1973a) argued, a family of events E causally depends on a family
of events C if E counterfactually depends on C. Putting it in words, E causally
depends on C if E would have occurred had C occurred, and E would not have
occurred had C not occurred.
Moreover, unlike nomic dependence, Lewis suggested that counterfactual
dependence is irreversible as a matter of commonplace (1973a, p. 564). That
is, for any two distinct families of events E1 and E2, if E2 counterfactually
depends on E1, it is not the case that E1 counterfactually depends on E2. In
other words, there is no mutual counterfactual dependence between E1 and
E2.1
Since the present purpose is to study Pearl’s principle of reversibility in
light of the notion of counterfactual dependence, I will not defend or criticize
the irreversibility of counterfactual dependence in detail. Suffice it to say that
it is an interesting principle with some prima facie plausibility.2
1There is debate as to whether the irreversibility of counterfactual dependence is really
that common, especially when backtracking counterfactuals are allowed. It is a kind of
counterfactuals in which the consequent temporally precedes the antecedent, which validates
implications from effects to causes. In Lewis (1979), he presents a standard resolution of
vagueness in reading counterfactuals and argues that backtracking counterfactuals should
receive a non-standard but special treatment. Moreover, he argues that the special would
eventually slip back to the standard. Jackson (1977) agrees that there are two kinds of
counterfactuals but there is nothing special about backtracking. He provides two different
truth conditions for foretracking and backtracking counterfactuals respectively. Bennett
(1984) partly agrees with Jackson that backtracking is not of a special kind, but he offers
a unified account which is applicable to both foretracking and backtracking. This thesis
remain neutral in this debate as long as the present purpose is to advocate a comparative
study between Lewis’s theory and Pearl’s. See chapter 6 of Hausman (1998) for a more
detailed discussion on backtracking counterfactuals.
2Zhang et al. (2012) provided a simple argument to support the prima facie plausibility. As
suggested by some theorists (Shoham 1990; Spirtes et al. 2000, p. 20), token causation is
anti-symmetric, if one accepts the Lewisian thesis that counterfactual dependence between
distinct events is sufficient for causation (e.g. Paul 2009), then one have to accept that
counterfactual dependence between distinct events is also anti-symmetric, thus irreversible.
Yet, Maudlin (2007) has provided a seemingly counterexample to the irreversibility of coun-
terfactual dependence. He argues that the event of Kennedy’s not being the president in
December 1963 shares a mutual counterfactual dependence with the event of his being as-
sassinated in November 1963 (2007, p. 144). However, there is a catch in his example that
the two cited events are not really distinct. As formulated by Lewis (1986a), “two events are
distinct if they have nothing in common: they are not identical, neither is a proper part of
the other, nor do they have any common part” (1986a, p. 212). In Maudlin’s example, one’s
being president has presupposed that he has not been assassinated, which in turn suggests
his not being assassinated is a proper part of his being president. Hence, the example does
not really threaten the plausibility of irreversibility of counterfactual dependence. Section
3.2 provides a more detailed investigation on the precondition of events’ distinctness.
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3.2. Pearl’s Reversibility and the Irreversibility of Counterfactual
Dependence
As introduced in the last chapter, the logical form of Pearl’s principle of
reversibility is:
(C5) ([X=x∧W =w] (Y (u)=y) ∧ [X=x∧Y =y] (W (u)=w))
⊃ [X=x] (Y (u)=y), if Y 6= W
(Reversibility)
And a restricted version of reversibility (by taking the set of variables in X as
empty) is:
(C5s) ([W=w](Y (u)=y)∧[Y=y](W (u)=w))⊃Y (u)=y, if Y 6= W
(Restricted Reversibility)
As shown in Zhang et al. (2012), despite its name, (C5s), if restricted to
binary variables, entails, and is entailed by, the irreversibility of counterfactual
dependence between distinct events. Their proof will be recast as follows. To
begin with, suppose that Y and Z are distinct binary variables representing
events EY and EZ respectively. Let Y = 1 represent the proposition that EY
occurs, i.e. O(EY ), and Y = 0 represent the proposition that EY does not
occur, i.e. ∼O(EY ). Similarly for Z, EZ , and O(EZ). Consider the following
two instances of reversibility:
([Y =1] (Z(u)=1) ∧ [Z=1] (Y (u)=1)) ⊃ Y (u)=1, if Y 6= Z
([Y =0] (Z(u)=0) ∧ [Z=0] (Y (u)=0)) ⊃ Y (u)=0, if Y 6= Z
By following the suggested translation advocated in chapter 2, and by substi-
tuting terms into propositions of event’s (non-)occurrence, we have:3
(♦(O(EY ) ∧O(EZ)) ∧ ♦(O(EY )∧ ∼O(EZ))
∧♦(∼O(EY ) ∧O(EZ)) ∧ ♦(∼O(EY )∧ ∼O(EZ)))
⊃ (((O(EY )→ O(EZ)) ∧ (O(EZ)→ O(EY )))⊃ O(EY ))
(1)
(♦(∼O(EY )∧ ∼O(EZ)) ∧ ♦(∼O(EY ) ∧O(EZ))
∧♦(O(EY )∧ ∼O(EZ)) ∧ ♦(O(EY ) ∧O(EZ)))
⊃ (((∼O(EY )→∼O(EZ)) ∧ (∼O(EZ)→∼O(EY )))
⊃∼O(EY ))
(2)
From (1) and (2), it follows that:
(♦(O(EY ) ∧O(EZ)) ∧ ♦(O(EY )∧ ∼O(EZ))
∧♦(∼O(EY ) ∧O(EZ)) ∧ ♦(∼O(EY )∧ ∼O(EZ)))
3φ in (C5t3) is taken as empty to simulate the restricted reversibility. It can also be done by
substituting a propositional tautology into φ.
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⊃ (((O(EY )→ O(EZ)) ∧ (O(EZ)→ O(EY ))
∧(∼O(EY )→∼O(EZ)) ∧ (∼O(EZ)→∼O(EY ))) ⊃ ⊥)
(3)
(3) entails that:
(♦(O(EY ) ∧O(EZ)) ∧ ♦(O(EY )∧ ∼O(EZ))
∧♦(∼O(EY ) ∧O(EZ)) ∧ ♦(∼O(EY )∧ ∼O(EZ)))
⊃ (((O(EY )→ O(EZ)) ∧ (∼O(EY )→∼O(EZ)))
⊃∼((O(EZ)→ O(EY )) ∧ (∼O(EZ)→∼O(EY ))))
(4)
One can notice that ((O(EY )→ O(EZ)) ∧ (∼O(EY )→∼O(EZ))) is pre-
cisely Lewis’s definition of counterfactual dependence of EY upon EZ , whereas
((O(EZ)→ O(EY )) ∧ (∼O(EZ)→∼O(EY ))) is that of the counterfactual
dependence of EZ upon EY . The antecedent of (4), i.e. (♦(O(EY )∧O(EZ))∧
♦(O(EY )∧ ∼O(EZ))∧♦(∼O(EY )∧O(EZ))∧♦(∼O(EY )∧ ∼O(EZ))), high-
lights that EY and EZ are distinct families of events, that is, each value com-
bination between proposition O(EY ) and O(EZ) is possible. So what (4) ex-
presses is precisely the irreversibility of counterfactual dependence: given that
EY and EZ are distinct, if EY counterfactually depends on EZ , then EZ does
not counterfactually depend on EY .
It is worth mentioning that the antecedent of (4) is indispensable. It means
that EY and EZ should not be identical, or overlap or stand somehow in logical
or conceptual relations. Thus, as Zhang et al. (2012) noted, (4) only starts
sounding plausible if EY and EZ are suitably distinct in the sense necessary
for them to stand in a causal relation.4 Thus, distinctness is stronger than
non-identity in this thesis. As explained in chapter 2, the antecedent of (4)
captures the condition that Y and Z are distinct variables. It is an implicit
convention in causal modeling that distinct variables cannot represent identical,
overlapping, or conceptually related events, given that every submodel of a
given model is considered to be possible, which means that distinct variables can
be independently manipulated. Therefore, distinct variables have to represent
suitably distinct families of events, if they represent families of events at all.5
The above has already proven that the restricted reversibility, when con-
strained to binary variables, entails the irreversibility of counterfactual depen-
dence between distinct events. What follows provides a proof for the other
4See Paul (2009). And see footnote 2 for Lewis’s (1986a) strict definition of distinctness.
5As pointed out by de Clercq, the antecedent of (4) can be satisfied by partially overlapping
events. Thus, the principle of irreversibility states that the two partically overlapping events
cannot stand in mutual counterfactual dependence, but in fact they can. Although both
Pearl and Lewis would not accept partially overlapping to stand in causal relation, it is not
clear how to revise (C5t3) to exclude them.
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direction. To make the proof more readable, the distinctness is suppressed for
the moment. It follows from (4) that:
((O(EY )→ O(EZ)) ∧ (O(EZ)→ O(EY )))
⊃∼((∼O(EZ)→∼O(EY )) ∧ (∼O(EZ)→∼O(EY )))
(5)
According to the axiom schema (VC5) (i.e. (φ ∧ ψ)⊃ (φ→ ψ)) in Lewis’sVC,
which is valid under Pearl’s semantics,6 the contrapositives of two instances of
(VC5) are:
∼(∼O(EZ)→∼O(EY )) ⊃∼(∼O(EZ)∧ ∼O(EY ))
∼(∼O(EY )→∼O(EZ)) ⊃∼(∼O(EY )∧ ∼O(EZ))
which entail the following:
∼((∼O(EZ)→∼O(EY )) ∧ (∼O(EZ)→∼O(EY )))
⊃ (O(EZ) ∨O(EY ))
(6)
(5) and (6) together entail that:
((O(EY )→ O(EZ)) ∧ (O(EZ)→ O(EY )))
⊃ (O(EZ) ∨O(EY ))
(7)
By the axiom schema (VC4) (i.e. (φ → ψ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ)) in VC, which is also
valid under Pearl’s semantics, an instance of this axiom is:
(O(EZ)→ O(EY )) ⊃ (O(EZ) ⊃ O(EY ))
(8)
By supplementing back the distinctness condition, it is not difficult to see that
(1) follows from (7) and (8). The other instances of reversibility (e.g. (2))
can be derived similarly. Therefore, restricted reversibility, when constrained
to binary variables, is precisely the principle that counterfactual dependence
between distinct families of events is irreversible.
I will generalize the above result in three steps. First, I will consider (C5s)
where variables that are not necessarily binary. Second, I will consider the
more general (C5) with only binary variables. Finally, I will present the most
general result, concerning (C5) applied to variables which are not necessarily
binary.
First generalization (G1)
Consider two distinct (not necessarily binary) variables Y and Z such that
R(Y ) = {y0, y1, . . . , ym} and R(Z) = {z0, z1, . . . , zn} where m,n ≥ 1. Suppose
6Both (VC4) and (VC5) follow from Pearl’s principle of composition (i.e. (C3)). See Pearl
(2009, pp. 240-241).
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that Y and Z respectively correspond to families of events {Ey0 , Ey1 , . . . , Eym}
and {Ez0 , Ez1 , . . . , Ezn}, such that Y = yi (where yi ∈ R(Y )) represents the
proposition that Eyi occurs, i.e. the proposition O(Eyi). Similarly for Z, any
zj ∈ R(Z), Ezj and O(Ezj).
Definition 3.2.1. Distinctness of families of events
For any two families of events EY ={Ey0 , Ey1 , . . . , Eym} and EZ =
{Ez0 , Ez1 , . . . , Ezn}, EY and EZ are distinct, written as D(EY , EZ),
iff
∧
0≤i≤m, 0≤j≤n♦(O(Eyi) ∧O(Ezj)) is true.
This definition helps to simplify the long antecedent of reversibility, especially
when the variables are non-binary.
Definition 3.2.2. Pairwise irreversibility of counterfactual dependence
For any two families of events EY and EZ , counterfactual dependence
between EY and EZ is pairwise irreversible, or say, there is no pairwise
mutual counterfactual dependence between them iff the following is true:
for any Eya , Eyb ∈ EY and Ezc , Ezd ∈ EZ (where a 6=b and c 6=d), if {Ezc , Ezd}
counterfactually depends on {Eya , Eyb}, then it is not the case that {Eya , Eyb}
counterfactually depends on {Ezc , Ezd} .
Irreversibility principle 1 (IP1)
For any two families of events EY and EZ , if EY and EZ are distinct, then
counterfactual dependence between them is pairwise irreversible.
I now show that (C5s) is equivalent to the (IP1). First, consider the following
instances of restricted reversibility:
([Y =ya] (Z(u)=zc) ∧ [Z=zc] (Y (u)=ya)) ⊃ Y (u)= ya, if Y 6= Z
([Y =yb] (Z(u)=zd) ∧ [Z=zd] (Y (u)=yb)) ⊃ Y (u)= yb,if Y 6= Z
where a 6=b and c 6=d
After translation and making use of Definition 3.2.1, we have:
D(EY , EZ) ⊃ (((O(Eya)→ O(Ezc))
∧ (O(Ezc)→ O(Eya))) ⊃ O(Eya))
(1)
D(EY , EZ) ⊃ (((O(Eyb)→ O(Ezd))
∧ (O(Ezd)→ O(Eyb))) ⊃ O(Eyb))
(2)
(1) and (2) together gives us that:
D(EY , EZ) ⊃ (((O(Eya)→ O(Ezc))
∧ (O(Ezc)→ O(Eya))∧ (O(Eyb)→ O(Ezd))
32
∧ (O(Ezd)→ O(Eyb)))⊃ (O(Eya) ∧ O(Eyb)))
(3)
Since O(Eya) and O(Eyb) are not compossible, it follows that:
D(EY , EZ) ⊃ (((O(Eya)→ O(Ezc))
∧ (O(Ezc)→ O(Eya))∧ (O(Eyb)→ O(Ezd))
∧ (O(Ezd)→ O(Eyb)))⊃⊥)
(4)
By simple rearrangement, (4) entails that:
D(EY , EZ) ⊃ (((O(Eya)→ O(Ezc))
∧ (O(Eyb)→ O(Ezd))) ⊃ ∼((O(Ezc)→ O(Eya))
∧ (O(Ezd)→ O(Eyb)))
(5)
(5) expresses exactly what is stated in the (IP1). That is, given that ya and yb
(also zc and zd) are arbitrary values of Y (and Z), (5) states that there is no
pairwise mutual counterfactual dependence between distinct families of events
EY and EZ . Thus, the principle follows from the restricted reversibility. Next,
to show the converse, (5) entails that:
D(EY , EZ) ⊃ (((O(Eya)→ O(Ezc))
∧ (O(Ezc)→ O(Eya))) ⊃ (∼(O(Eyb)→ O(Ezd))
∨∼(O(Ezd)→ O(Eyb))))
(6)
From the axiom (VC5) schema (i.e. (φ ∧ ψ) ⊃ (φ → ψ)) inVC, two instances
of its contrapositive form are:
∼(O(Ezd)→ O(Eyb)) ⊃∼(O(Ezd) ∧O(Eyb))
∼(O(Eyb)→ O(Ezd)) ⊃∼(O(Eyb) ∧O(Ezd))
These two instances and (6) entail that:
D(EY , EZ) ⊃ (((O(Eya)→ O(Ezc))
∧ (O(Ezc)→ O(Eya))) ⊃ (∼O(Eyb)∨ ∼O(Ezd)))
(7)
Since Eyb (and Ezd) is an arbitrary event that is not compossible with Eya (and
Ezc), it follows that:
D(EY , EZ) ⊃ (((O(Eya)→ O(Ezc))
∧ (O(Ezc)→ O(Eya))) ⊃ (O(Eya) ∨O(Ezc)))
(8)
An instance of the axiom (VC4) schema (i.e. (φ → ψ) ⊃ (φ ⊃ ψ)) in VC is:
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(O(Ezc)→ O(Eya)) ⊃ (O(Ezc) ⊃ O(Eya))
(9)
Similar to the simple analysis stated, (1) follows from (8) and (9). Other in-
stances can be derived in a very much similar manner. It shows that restricted
reversibility follows from the irreversibility principle 1. Hence, (IP1) is equiva-
lent to (C5s).
Second generalization (G2)
Next, I generalize from (C5s) to (C5) with only binary variables. Consider two
distinct binary variables Y and Z which correspond to binary families of events
EY and EZ respectively, such that Y = 1 represents the proposition that EY
occurs, i.e. O(EY ), and Y = 0 represents the proposition that EY does not
occur, i.e. ∼O(EY ). Similarly for Z, EZ , and O(EZ). Also consider a set of
variables X and let it corresponds to a family of events EX, such that for any
X ∈ X, X = x represents the proposition O(EX), i.e. the occurrence of the
event EX .
Definition 3.2.3. Relative distinctness of families of events
For any two families of events EY = {Ey0 , Ey1 , . . . , Eym}, EZ =
{Ez0 , Ez1 , . . . , Ezn}, and any event E, EY and EZ are distinct relative to E,
written as D(EY , EZ |E), iff the following is true:∧
0≤i≤m, 0≤j≤n♦(O(E) ∧O(Eyi) ∧O(Ezj)) .
Definition 3.2.4. Relative counterfactual dependence
For any event E, any two families of events EY and EZ , any Eya , Eyb ∈ EY
and Ezc , Ezd ∈ EZ (where a 6= b and c 6= d), {Ezc , Ezd} counterfactually
depends on {Eya , Eyb} relative to E iff (((O(E) ∧ O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
∧ ((O(E) ∧O(Eyb))→ O(Ezd))) is true.
The notion of counterfactual dependence relative to an event in
Definition 3.2.4 has a philosophical motivation. Lewis (1973a) defined the
concept of causal chain to solve problems of preemption. A causal chain is a
finite sequence of actual events E1, E2, ..., En where Ei+1 causally depends on
Ei for all i ≥ 1. Ei is a cause of Ej iff there is a causal chain from Ei to Ej.
For instance, a senior assassin and a junior assassin are on a mission to shoot a
dictator. The senior assassin plays as a backup just in case the junior assassin
fails to pull his trigger, possibly due to his nervousness. The junior assassin
shoots and the dictator dies. The dictator’s death neither counterfactually de-
pends on the junior’s shot, nor that of the senior’s. However, there is a causal
chain between the junior’s shot and the dictator’s death containing interme-
diary events, like the speeding of the bullet and the hitting of the dictator’s
body. But there is no such a causal chain linking up the senior’s shot and the
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death of the dictator. The concept of causal chain is then handy for Lewis
to differentiate the preempted potential cause (i.e. the senior’s shot) from the
preempting actual cause (i.e. the junior’s shot).
Making use of causal chains has the price of embracing transitivity. Not
every writer agrees with Lewis that the price is worth paying. Hitchcock (2001),
Halpern and Pearl (2005), and Woodward (2003) have employed a very similar
concept of counterfactual dependence relative to an event (or events) in their
own account of actual causation. To test whether a variable has a casual
influence on another variable by hypothetical intervention, the value of other
variables has to be fixed. As named by Halpern and Pearl (2005), the value
of the other variables needed to be held fixed is the structural contingency. In
these treatments, no assumption of transitivity is needed but preemption can
also be neatly explained with the notion of relative counterfactual dependence.
Then, the irreversibility principle is formulated as:
Irreversibility principle 2 (IP2)
For any two binary families of events EY , EZ , and family of events EX,
if EY and EZ are distinct relative to an event EX ∈ EX, counterfactual
dependence between EY and EZ relative to EX is irreversible.
I now show that (C5), when Y and Z are restricted to binary variables, is
equivalent to (IP2). First, consider the following instances of reversibility:
([X=x ∧ Y =1] (Z(u)=1) ∧ [X=x ∧ Z=1] (Y (u)=1))
⊃ [X=x] (Y (u)=1), if Y 6= Z
([X=x ∧ Y =0] (Z(u)=0) ∧ [X=x ∧ Z=0] (Y (u)=0))
⊃ [X=x] (Y (u)=0), if Y 6= Z
After translation, they become:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(EY ))→ O(EZ))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(EZ))→ O(EY )))⊃ (O(EX)→ O(EY )))
(1)
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX)∧ ∼O(EY ))→∼O(EZ))
∧ ((O(EX)∧ ∼O(EZ))→∼O(EY )))⊃ (O(EX)→∼O(EY )))
(2)
(1) and (2) entail that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(EY ))→ O(EZ))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(EZ))→ O(EY ))
∧ ((O(EX)∧ ∼O(EY ))→∼O(EZ))
∧ ((O(EX)∧ ∼O(EZ))→∼O(EY )))
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⊃ ((O(EX)→ O(EY )) ∧ (O(EX)→∼O(EY ))))
(3)
Here is an instance of the axiom (C1) (i.e. equality) in Pearl’s AXuniq(S):7
[X = x] (Y (u)=0) ⊃ [X = x] (Y (u) 6=1), if 0, 1 ∈ R(X).
Its translated form is:
(O(EX)→∼O(EY ))⊃ ∼(O(EX)→ O(EY ))
(4)
It follows from (3) and (4) that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(EY ))→ O(EZ))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(EZ))→ O(EY ))
∧ ((O(EX)∧ ∼O(EY ))→∼O(EZ))
∧ ((O(EX)∧ ∼O(EZ))→∼O(EY ))) ⊃⊥)
(5)
It is easy to see that (5) entails that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(EY ))→ O(EZ))
∧ ((O(EX)∧ ∼O(EY ))→∼O(EZ)))
⊃ ∼(((O(EX) ∧O(EZ))→ O(EY ))
∧ ((O(EX)∧ ∼O(EZ))→∼O(EY ))))
(6)
Manifestly, (6) is the claim that counterfactual dependence between EY and EZ
relative to EX is irreversible. Thus, (C5), when restricted to binary variables,
entails (IP2). Next, I show the derivation from the other side. It follows from
(6) that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(EY ))→ O(EZ))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(EZ))→ O(EY )))
⊃ (∼((O(EX)∧ ∼O(EY ))→∼O(EZ))
∨ ∼((O(EX)∧ ∼O(EZ))→∼O(EY ))))
(7)
Here are some theorem schemata from Lewis’s VC:
(VC3) (φ →∼ψ) ∨ (((φ∧ψ) → χ) ≡ (φ → (ψ⊃χ)))8
(VCt1) (∼((φ∧ψ) → χ)∧ (φ → (ψ⊃χ)))⊃ (φ →∼ψ)
(VCt2) (((φ∧ψ) → χ) ⊃ (φ → (ψ⊃χ)))∨ (φ →∼ψ)
(VCt3) (((φ∧ψ) → χ)∧ ∼(φ → (ψ⊃χ))) ⊃ (φ →(ψ⊃χ))
7As discussed in chapter 2, the translated form of equality is valid in Lewis’s system in the
non-vacuous cases.
8(VC3) follows from Pearl’s principle of composition (i.e. (C3)), equality (i.e. (C1)) and
definiteness (i.e. (C2)).
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(VCt4) ((φ∧ψ) → χ) ⊃ (φ →(ψ⊃χ))
Both (VCt1) and (VCt2) are derived from (VC3), (VCt3) from (VCt2), and
(VCt4) from (VCt3). Two instances of (VCt4) are:
((O(EX) ∧O(EY ))→ O(EZ)) ⊃ (O(EX)→ (O(EY )⊃ O(EZ)))
((O(EX) ∧O(EZ))→ O(EY )) ⊃ (O(EX)→ (O(EZ)⊃ O(EY )))
It follows from these two instances that:
(((O(EX) ∧O(EY ))→ O(EZ)) ∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(EZ))→ O(EY )))
⊃ (O(EX)→ (O(EY ) ≡ O(EZ)))
(8)
(((O(EX) ∧O(EY ))→ O(EZ)) ∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(EZ))→ O(EY )))
⊃ ((O(EX)→ (∼O(EY ) ⊃∼O(EZ)))
∧ (O(EX)→ (∼O(EZ) ⊃∼O(EY ))))
(9)
It is not hard to see that (7) and (9) entail the following:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(EY ))→ O(EZ))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(EZ))→ O(EY )))
⊃ ((∼((O(EX)∧ ∼O(EY ))→∼O(EZ))
∧ (O(EX)→ (∼O(EY ) ⊃∼O(EZ))))
∨ (∼((O(EX)∧ ∼O(EZ))→∼O(EY ))
∧ (O(EX)→ (∼O(EZ) ⊃∼O(EY )))))
(10)
Two instances of (VCt1) are:
(∼((O(EX)∧∼O(EY )) → ∼O(EZ))
∧ (O(EX) → (∼O(EY )⊃∼O(EZ))))⊃ (O(EX) →O(EY ))
(∼((O(EX)∧∼O(EZ)) → ∼O(EY ))
∧ (O(EX) → (∼O(EZ)⊃∼O(EY ))))⊃ (O(EX) →O(EZ))
Together with (10), it follows from these two instances that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(EY ))→ O(EZ))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(EZ))→ O(EY )))
⊃ ((O(EX)→ O(EY )) ∨ (O(EX)→ O(EZ)))
(11)
(11) and (8) together deduce (1), which is an instance of the translated re-
versibility. Hence, similar to the result shown in the last generalization, when
restricted to binary variables, (C5) is equivalent to (IP2).
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Final generalization (G3)
Lastly, the result in (G2) will be generalized with regard to variables which are
not necessarily binary. Consider two distinct (possibly non-binary) variables Y
and Z such that R(Y )={y0, y1, ..., ym} and R(Z)={z0, z1, ..., zn} where m,n ≥
1. Suppose that Y and Z correspond to families of events {Ey0 , Ey1 , . . . , Eym}
and {Ez0 , Ez1 , . . . , Ezn} respectively such that Y = yi (where yi ∈ R(Y )) rep-
resents the proposition that Eyi occurs, i.e. the proposition O(Eyi). Similarly
for Z, any zj ∈ R(Z), Ezj and O(Ezj). Also consider a set of variables X and
suppose that it corresponds to a family of events EX, such that for any X ∈ X,
X = x represents the proposition O(EX), i.e. the occurrence of the event EX .
Definition 3.2.5. Pairwise irreversibility of relative counterfactual
dependence
For any families of events EY and EZ and EX, counterfactual
dependence between EY and EZ relative to EX is pairwise irrversible
iff the following is true:
for any event EX ∈ EX, and any Eya , Eyb ∈ EY and Ezc , Ezd ∈ EZ (where
a 6= b and c 6= d), if {Ezc , Ezd} counterfactually depends on {Eya , Eyb}
relative to EX , then it is not the case that {Eya , Eyb} counterfactually
depends on {Ezc , Ezd}.
Irreversibility principle 3 (IP3)
For any two families of events EY and EZ and EX, if EY and EZ are
distinct relative to an event EX ∈ EX, then counterfactual dependence
between EY and EZ relative to EX is pairwise irreversible.
First of all, consider the following instances of reversibility:
([X=x ∧ Y =a] (Z(u)=c) ∧ [X=x ∧ Z=c] (Y (u)=a))
⊃ [X=x] (Y (u)=a), if Y 6= Z
([X=x ∧ Y =b] (Z(u)=d) ∧ [X=x ∧ Z=d] (Y (u)=d))
⊃ [X=x] (Y (u)=b), if Y 6= Z
where a 6=b and c 6=d
After translation, they become:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezc))→ O(Eya)))⊃ (O(EX)→ O(Eya)))
(1)
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(Eyb))→ O(Ezd))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezd))→ O(Eyb)))⊃ (O(EX)→ O(Eyb)))
(2)
(1) and (2) entail that:
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D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezc))→ O(Eya))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Eyb))→ O(Ezd))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezd))→ O(Eyb)))
⊃ ((O(EX)→ O(Eya)) ∧ (O(EX)→ O(Eyb))))
(3)
Here is an instance of the axiom (C1) (i.e. equality) in AXuniq(S):
[X = x] (Y (u)=ya) ⊃ [X = x] (Y (u) 6= yb), if ya 6= yb ∈ R(X)
By simple translation, it becomes:
(O(EX)→∼O(Eya))⊃∼(O(EX)→ O(Eyb))
(4)
It follows from (3) and (4) that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezc))→ O(Eya))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Eyb))→ O(Ezd))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezd))→ O(Eyb)))⊃⊥)
(5)
Similar to the above generalizations, (5) entails that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧ (Eyb))→ O(Ezd)))
⊃ ∼(((O(EX) ∧O(Ezc))→ O(Eya))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezd))→ (Eyb))))
(6)
It is evident that (6) is the irreversibility principle 3 defined above. Thus, (IP3)
follows from (C5). I now show the other direction. It follows from (6) that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezc))→ O(Eya)))
⊃ (∼((O(EX) ∧O(Eyb))→ O(Ezd))
∨ ∼((O(EX) ∧O(Ezd))→ O(Eyb))))
(7)
From the axiom schema (S) (i.e. (φ → ψ) ∨ (φ → ∼ ψ)) in VCS, the
theorem schema ∼ (φ → ψ) ⊃ (φ → ∼ ψ) follows. Two instances of this
theorem schema are:
∼((O(EX) ∧O(Eyb)) → O(Ezd))
⊃ ((O(EX) ∧O(Eyb)) → ∼O(Ezd))
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∼((O(EX) ∧O(Ezd)) → O(Eyb))
⊃ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezd)) → ∼O(Eyb))
These instances and (7) entail that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezc))→ O(Eya)))
⊃ (((O(EX) ∧O(Eyb))→∼O(Ezd))
∨ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezd))→∼O(Eyb))))
(8)
Two instances of (VCt4) are:
((O(EX) ∧O(Eyb))→∼O(Ezd))
⊃ (O(EX)→ (O(Eyb) ⊃∼O(Ezd)))
((O(EX) ∧O(Ezd))→∼O(Eyb))
⊃ (O(EX)→ (O(Ezd) ⊃∼O(Eyb)))
The following is derived from (8) and these two instances:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezc))→ O(Eya)))
⊃ (O(EX)→ (O(Eyb) ⊃∼O(Ezd))))
(9)
Another two instances of (VCt4) are:
((O(EX) ∧O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
⊃ (O(EX)→ (O(Eya) ⊃ O(Ezc)))
((O(EX) ∧O(Ezc))→ O(Eya))
⊃ (O(EX)→ (O(Ezc) ⊃ O(Eya)))
(9) and these two instances together entail that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezc))→ O(Eya)))
⊃ ((O(EX)→ (O(Eyb) ⊃∼O(Ezd)))
∧ (O(EX)→ (O(Eya) ≡ O(Ezc)))))
(10)
Since Eyb (and Ezb) is an arbitrary event that is not compossible with and Eya
(and Ezc), it follows that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezc))→ O(Eya)))
⊃ (O(EX)→ ((O(Eyb) ⊃ O(Ezc))
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∧ (O(Eya) ≡ O(Ezc)))))
(11)
It then entails that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezc))→ O(Eya)))
⊃ (O(EX)→ ((O(Eyb) ⊃ O(Eya))))
(12)
Since Eyb is not compossible with Eya , it follows that:
D(EY , EZ |EX) ⊃ ((((O(EX) ∧O(Eya))→ O(Ezc))
∧ ((O(EX) ∧O(Ezc))→ O(Eya)))
⊃ (O(EX)→ O(Eya)))
(13)
Once again, (13) is our translated reversibility. With regard to the axiom-
schema (S) in VCS, reversibility follows from (IP3). Therefore, when general-
ized to variables which are not necessarily binary, (C5) is equivalent to (IP3).9
These generalizations reveal the equivalence between Pearl’s principle of
reversibility, in its full generality, and the statement that (relative) counterfac-
tual dependence is (pairwise) irreversibility in Pearl’s counterfactual logic (or
Stalnaker’s).
3.3. Cyclic Counterfactual Dependence and a Peculiarity in Pearl’s
Logic
As argued in Zhang et al. (2012), treating the claim that counterfactual
dependence between distinct (families of) events is always irreversible as a
logical principle instead of a mere commonplace is not entirely implausible.
Here is their argument. Given that some authors seem to think that token
causation is anti-symmetric (e.g. Shoham 1990; Spirtes et al., 2000, p. 20), if
one also accepts the Lewisian thesis that counterfactual dependence between
distinct families of events is sufficient for causation, then one has to accept
that counterfactual dependence between distinct families of events is also anti-
symmetric.
On top of that, when supplemented with another Lewisian thesis that token
causation is transitive, the above argument leads to the thesis that there is no
9Nevertheless, unlike (G1) and (G2), reversibility cannot be entailed by the irreversibility
with Lewis’s VC alone. Appendix provides a counter-model (in M). It is a conjecture
that Pearl’s reversibility, given a feasible translation, is equivalent to the law of conditional
excluded middle (i.e. (S)) plus the irreversibility of counterfactual dependence. This hunch is
motivated by two facts. First, as shown in chapter 2, even though Stalnaker’s logic contains
(S), reversibility is not valid in it. Second, as suggested by this counter-model, reversibility
does not follow from irreversibility if (S) is absent. A detailed investigation of this conjecture
awaits another occasion to be fully developed.
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cyclic counterfactual dependence, as cyclic counterfactual dependence entails
cyclic causation, and any cyclic causation implies mutual causation (by the
transitivity of causation).
Basically, a cycle of counterfactual dependence is that, for a sequence n ≥
2 of distinct families of events, E1, . . . , Ek, such that Ei+1 counterfactually
depends on Ei for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, and E1 counterfactually depends on Ek.
Mutual counterfactual dependence is merely a special case by restricting cyclic
counterfactual dependence to length two. It is, indeed, hard to see what is
metaphysically special about cyclic counterfactual dependence of length two.
In the argument just stated, the transitivity of causation is not indisputable
in the discussion of causation (Hall 2000; Hitchcock 2001).10 As Zhang et al.
(2012) mentioned, the argument can be simplified by strengthening the premise
of no mutual causation to the premise of no cyclic causation, without assum-
ing transitivity. The intuition behind our argument is that, even though the
premise of cyclic causation is stronger than that of no mutual causation, they
stand and fall together metaphysically. Hence, the argument against mutual
counterfactual dependence is as strong as the argument against cyclic counter-
factual dependence. We argued that, if a theory endorses the principle of no
mutual counterfactual dependence without endorsing that of no cyclic coun-
terfactual dependence, it is peculiar since it would amount to an unmotivated
discrimination against cycles of length two.11
Pearl’s semantics, interestingly, has exactly this peculiarity. Although it
contains the principle of no mutual counterfactual dependence between two dis-
tinct families of events, it does allow three or more distinct families of events to
form a cycle of counterfactual dependence. Zhang et al. (2012) provided a very
simple Pearlian model that contains a cycle of counterfactual dependence.12
Example 3.3.1. A Pearlian model with a cycle of counterfactual
dependence
T =< U,V, R, F >
U = {}, V = {X1, X2, X3}
R(X1) = R(X2) = R(X3) = {0, 1}
X1 =∼X2 ∨X3
10Hall (2000) provided some examples in which transitivity of causation is incompatible with
the claim that counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation.
11As suggested by one of the examiners, a possible response to our argument is that Pearl’s
logic is said to be peculiar and umotivated only because of the tacit yet questionable as-
sumption of causal transitivity. As abovementioned, causal transitivity is not an indisputable
assumption. Contrarily, if it were indisputable, the conclusion of my argument would not
be a peculiarity of Pearl’s logic, but a self-contradiction of it. I concede that what sounds
peculiar (or unmotivated) to one may appear to be perfectly innocent to another. But it
is still plausible to suggest the peculiarity given that one does not refute causal transitivity
wholesale.
12An extremely similar model was used in Halpern (2010) for a different purpose.
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Figure 3.3.1
X2 =∼X3 ∨X1
X3 =∼X1 ∨X2
See G(T ) in Figure 3.3.1.
T is in Tuniq(S) since every submodel has a unique solution. In partic-
ular, the solution {X1 =1, X2 =1, X3 =1} is unique to the submodels TX1=1,
TX2=1, and TX3=1. Hence, the counterfactuals [X1 =1] (X2 = 1), [X2 =1] (X3 =
1), [X3 =1] (X1 =1) are all true in T . More than that, the following three coun-
terfactuals are also true in T : [X1 =0] (X2 =0), [X2 =0] (X3 =0), [X3 =0] (X1 =
0), due to the fact that the submodel TX1=0 has the solution {X1 =0, X2 =0, X3 =1},
TX2=0 has the solution {X1 =1, X2 =0, X3 =0}, and finally, TX3=0 has the solu-
tion {X1 =0, X2 =1, X3 =0}. By symbolizing X1, X2, X3, as three distinct fam-
ilies of events E1, E2, and E3 respectively, the given two sets of counterfactuals
imply a cycle of counterfactual dependence of length three: E2 counterfactually
depends on E1, E3 counterfactually depends on E2, and E1 counterfactually
depends on E3.
This simple model shows that Pearl’s logic merely rules out cycles of length
two. This is indeed the unmotivated discrimination against cycles of length
two, as the mentioned argument suggests. Unless there is a justification for
this discrimination, it sounds reasonable that Pearl’s logic is either too strong
by denying the possibility of mutual counterfactual dependence, or too weak
by allowing possibility of cyclic counterfactual dependence.13
To avoid the peculiarity, on the one hand, Pearl’s logic can be weakened
to allow any length of cyclic counterfactual dependence, for example, by pur-
suing an axiomatization in which its corresponding semantics does not con-
tain the property of unique solution. On the other hand, Pearl’s logic can
be strengthened to deny the possibility of any length of cyclic counterfactual
dependence. A possible suggestion is to adopt the logic AXrec(S), which is
stronger than AXuniq(S). In the remaining of this chapter, I will argue that
adopting AXrec(S) is not necessary, even though it is sufficient, in overcoming
the peculiarity. I will suggest that a logic which contains a principle weaker
than the principle of recursiveness (i.e. (C6)) can also avoid the peculiarity by
strengthening Pearl’s logic. First, the following is a principle which aims to
13Zhang et al. (2012) have attempted an explanation which might lead to a justification of
the peculiarity. See chapter 4 of this thesis for a brief description of this explanation.
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tackle the peculiarity by disallowing any length of cyclic counterfactual depen-
dence:
Principle of no cyclic counterfactual dependence (NC)
For any families of events E1, . . . , Ek, and EX, if Ei and Ej are distinct
relative to EX ∈ EX for any i and j ranged from 1 to k (where i 6= j),
and if {Ei+10 , Ei+11} counterfactually depends on {Ei0 , Ei1} relative to EX
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k−1, then it is not the case that {E10 , E11} counterfactually
depends on {Ek0 , Ek1} relative to EX .
This principle generalizes the irreversibility of counterfactual dependence, which
merely forbids cyclic counterfactual dependence with length two. One can eas-
ily spot that (NC) is equivalent to (IP2) by restricting k = 2. On the other
hand, the following provides a generalized principle of reversibility.
(GC5) ([X=x ∧ Y1 =y1] (Y2(u)=y2)∧...
∧ [X=x∧Yk−1 =yk−1] (Yk(u)=yk)
∧ [X=x∧Yk=yk] (Y1(u)=y1)) ⊃ [X=x] (Y2(u)=y2)
where k≥2 and Yi 6= Yj for all i and j within the range from 1 to k
(Generalized Reversibility)
Similarly, (GC5) is exactly (C5) when k = 2. Given the shown equivalence
between Pearl’s reversibility and the irreversibility principle of counterfactual
dependence in the last section, it is easy to see (GC5) is equivalent to (NC)
when restricted to binary variables.14
On the other hand, (C6) states that, for any variables X1, ..., Xk in V, if
X1  X2, ..., Xk−1  Xk, then it is not the case that Xk  X1. Let’s recall
the definition of Y  Z (read: the variable Y affects the variable Z). It is true
iff the following is true:∨
X⊆V, x∈×X∈VR(X), ya∈R(Y ),u∈×U∈UR(U), zc 6=zd∈R(Z)
([X=x ∧ Y =ya](Z(u)=zc)∧[X=x](Z(u)=zd))
(Affect)
For a better comparison with generalized reversibility, it might be useful to
show that the following formulation is equivalent to (Affect),∨
X⊆V, x∈×X∈VR(X), ya 6=yb∈R(Y ),u∈×U∈UR(U), zc 6=zd∈R(Z)
([X=x ∧ Y =ya](Z(u)=zc)∧[X=x ∧ Y =yb](Z(u)=zd))
(Affect-C)15
Theorem 3.3.2. (Affect) is equivalent to (Affect-C).
14The proof of equivalence between (NC) and (GC5) is extremely similar to the proof given
in (G2). I leave the proof to the reader.
15The C in (Affect-C) denotes the contrastive intervention between Y = ya and Y = yb
where a 6= b.
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Figure 3.3.2
Proof. Suppose that (Affect) is true. Let ya be the value of Y under the
intervention [X=x], givenU=u. From [X=x] (Z(u)=zd) and [X=x] (Y (u)=
yb), [X=x ∧ Y =yb] (Z(u) = zd) follows by composition. For the sake of con-
tradiction, suppose that ya =yb. However, given that zc 6= zd, [X=x ∧ Y =yb]
(Z(u) = zc) and [X=x ∧ Y =yb] (Z(u) = zd) form a contradiction (by equal-
ity). Hence, ya 6= yb and (Affect-C) follows from [X=x ∧ Y =ya] (Z(u) =
zc) and [X=x ∧ Y =yb] (Z(u) = zd). Conversely, suppose that (Affect-C) is
true. Let zc be the value of Z under the intervention [X=x], given U = u.
Given that the value of Z under the intervention [X=x ∧ Y =ya] is different
from the value under the intervention [X=x ∧ Y =yb], it follows that either
[X=x ∧ Y =ya] (Z(u) 6= zc) or [X=x ∧ Y =yb] (Z(u) 6= zc). Therefore, (Af-
fect) follows from (Affect-C). 
It is notable that both generalized reversibility and recursiveness are prin-
ciples with regard to no cycles of certain dependence relations. For generalized
reversibility, the dependence relation is obviously that of counterfactual de-
pendence, more precisely, counterfactual dependence relative to a fixed event;
whereas for recursiveness, the dependence relation is that of the notation (Af-
fect). It can be seen from (Affect-C) that the affect relation is defined in terms
of counterfactual dependence as well, but the dependence is relative to some
event, or some contingencies, instead of a fixed event in generalized reversibility.
The following causal model illustrates the difference at stake more explicitly.
Example 3.3.3. T =< U,V, R, F >
U = {U}, V = {X, Y }
R(U) = R(X) = R(Y ) = {0, 1}
X = U ∧ Y
Y = U ∨X
See G(T ) in Figure 3.3.2.
The causal model in this example is in Tuniq(S), that is, every submodel of
T has a unique solution. Interestingly, (GC5) is true in this model, but not
(C6). (C6) is violated obviously due to the cycles, for example, resulted from
X  Y and Y  X. Nevertheless, when U = 1, the value of Y is always 1
(unless intervened as 0), no matter what value X takes. The truth of X  Y
is granted when U = 0, that is, from [X = 0] (Y (0) = 0) ∧ [X = 1] (Y (0) = 1).
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On the contrary, when U =0, the value of X is always 0 (unless intervened as
1), no matter what value Y takes. It is when U =1 that intervening the value
of Y alters the value of X. From [Y = 0] (X(1) = 0) ∧ [Y = 1] (X(1) = 1),
Y  X follows.
This example immediately confirms the mentioned difference of the depen-
dence relation between (GC5) and (C6). The circumstances under which X
affects Y and that under which Y affects X are different. In the former, it is
U = 0 which make X  Y true in T , whereas U = 0 does not make Y  X
true in T . This is the suggested contingency which is varied but not fixed. In
contrast, (GC5) merely forbid the cycle of counterfactual dependence relative
to a fixed event. Putting it differently, there is no u of U and no submodel of T
that there is a cyclic counterfactual dependence held between X and Y when
they are taken to be families of events. Thus, the acyclicity of the dependence
relation between (GC5) and (C6) are different.16
Manifestly, (GC5) is entailed by (C6), but not vice versa.17 Therefore, in
order to avoid the peculiarity by disallowing any length of cylic counterfactual
dependence, adopting (C6) is unnecessary in spite of its sufficiency. It is more
preferable to adopt (GC5).
Consequently, it is intuitive that a class of models which is sound and
complete for an axiomatic system consists of (C0)-(C4), (GC5), and MP is
able to rule out all cyclic counterfactual dependence.18 However, it is an open
question whether there is an interesting and independent characterization of
the class of models that validates (GC5). Another interesting question is what
logics in the Lewis-Stalnaker framework rule out all cycles of counterfactual
16In Zhang et al. (2012), we suggest a logic which rules out all cycles of counterfactual
dependence and it is weaker than AXrec(S). This logic contains (GC5), but not (C6), and it
characterizes causal models that are, so to speak, acyclic (or recursive) at a token level, but
not necessarily at a type level. By contrast, AXrec(S) characterizes causal models that are
recursive at a type level. The idea of distinguishing between different levels of acyclicity (or
recursiveness) is borrowed from the discussion of token causal claims and type causal claims.
Indeed, whether they are reducible to each other and whether one is more fundamental are
controversial debates in the literature on causation. See Hausman (2005) and Ehring (2009)
for an in-depth survey of these issues.
17First, by reductio, suppose that (C6) is true and (GC5) is false. That is [X=x] (Y2(u)=y2)
is false and it is true that [X=x] (Y2(u) = y′2) where y2 6= y′2 ∈ Y2. Then it follows
from [X=x ∧ Y1=y1] (Y2(u) = y2) that Y1 affects Y2. Next, either Y2 affects Y3 or Y2
does not affect Y3. Suppose it does not, then it follows that [X=x] (Y3(u) = y3). Also,
[X=x] (Y4(u) = y4) follows from [X=x ∧ Y3=y3] (Y4(u) = y4) and finally [X=x] (Y1(u) =
y1) from [X=x ∧ Yk=yk] (Y1(u) = y1). But then [X=x ∧ Y1=y1] (Y2(u) = y2) and
[X=x] (Y1(u) = y1) entail that [X=x] (Y2(u) = y2) which contradicts [X=x] (Y2(u) = y′2).
Thus, Y2 affects Y3. A similar argument works in showing that Y3 affects Y4 and so on till
Yk affects Y1. However, it then contradicts (C6) and hence (GC5) follows from (C6). On the
other hand, a simple model like Example 2.2.2 shows that (GC5) does not entail (C6).
18It is an axiomatic system stronger than AXuniq(S). I do not include (C5) as it follows
from (GC5).
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dependence. The remaining of this chapter will show that the logic VCSR
proposed in the previous chapter is precisely one such logic.
The general argument is this: as VCSR contains the translated reversibil-
ity (i.e. (C5t3)) and reversibility is shown to be equivalent to the irreversibil-
ity principle (i.e. no mutual counterfactual dependence), that logic obviously
rules out mutual counterfactual dependence between distinct single events. If,
moreover, we can show that cyclic counterfactual dependence entails mutual
counterfactual dependence in that logic, then no cyclic counterfactual depen-
dence is allowed in VCSR. The core step of this argument is thus to show that
given a cycle of counterfactual dependence among some distinct single events,
there is a mutual counterfactual dependence between any two distinct single
events in the cycle.19
Let (EXi⇒EXj |EY ) represent the formula ((O(EY )∧O(EXi))→ O(EXj))∧
((O(EY )∧ ∼O(EXi))→∼O(EXj)), where O(EY ),O(EXi), O(EXj)∈L. Simi-
larly, let (EXi⇒EXj) abbrevaite the formula that (O(EXi)→ O(EXj)) ∧ (∼
O(EXi) →∼O(EXj)). Naturally, (EXi⇒EXj |EY ) is read as EXj counterfac-
tually depends on EXi relative to EY . Then, (NC) becomes:∧
1≤i≤k,1≤j≤k,i6=j D(EXi , EXj |EY )
⊃ (∧ 1≤i≤k−1 (EXi⇒EXi+1|EY )⊃∼(EXk⇒EX1 |EY ))
Similarly, (C5t3) can be paraphrased as:
D(EXi , EXj |EY )⊃ ((EXi⇒EXj |EY ) ⊃∼(EXj⇒EXi |EY ))
by substituting φ as O(EY ), ψ and χ with O(EXi) and O(EXj) respectively.
Lemma 3.3.4. For any M ∈ MS, where M = 〈W, I, f〉 such that for
any world w ∈ W , and any set of formulas {φ1, ..., φk} ⊆ L (where
k ≥ 2), if it is true that in w that φi and φj are distinct relative to
ψ ∈ L for any i and j (ranged from 1 to k where i 6= j), and ((ψ ∧ φ1)
∧... ∧ ((ψ ∧ φk−1)→ φk) ∧ ((ψ∧φk)→ φ1) is true in w, then for any
formulas φi, φj ∈ {φ1, ..., φk} which are distinct relative to ψ,((ψ ∧ φi)
→ φj)∧((ψ ∧ φj)→φi) is true in w.20
Proof. Suppose that, for any i and j (ranged from 1 to k where i 6= j), φi
and φj are distinct relative to ψ in w, and ((ψ∧φ1)→ φ2)∧...∧((ψ∧φk−1)→
φk) ∧ ((ψ ∧ φk)→ φ1) is true in w. First of all, consider the unique world in
19As mentioned in the very beginning of this chapter, I usually consider families of events
which contain exactly two members to simulate single events (with occurrence and non-
occurrence as its members) for the sake of simplicity.
20The following proof is inspired by Halpern (2010). Note that in Lemma 3.3.4 (and
Lemma 3.3.5 as well) that M is in MS , but not restricted to its subclass MSR. That is,
the lemma can be proved by the original Stalnaker’s semantics without our additional con-
dition (SR). Moreover, a similar proof can be done by relaxing the class of models from MS
to M. However, I suspect that the lemma can be proved without the limit assumption.
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the set of the closest ψ ∧ (φ1 ∨ ...∨ φk)-worlds to w, name it w1. The fact that
the set of the closest ψ ∧ (φ1 ∨ ... ∨ φk)-worlds is non-empty is guaranteed by
the initial supposition that φi and φj are distinct relative to ψ in w for any i
and j. Without loss of generality, suppose that w1 is a ψ ∧ φ1-world (no loss
of generality due to the cycle among φ1, ..., φk). I claim that w1 is the unique
world in the set of the closest ψ ∧ φ1-worlds to w (i.e. f(ψ ∧ φ1, w) = {w1}).
By reductio, suppose that w1 is not in f(ψ ∧ φ1, w). It entails that there
is a closer ψ ∧ φ1-world to w than w1, call it w2. Of course, w2 is also a
ψ ∧ (φ1 ∨ ... ∨ φk)-world. Then w2 is closer than w1 to w and it immediately
contradicts the supposition that w1 is the unique world in the set of the closest
ψ ∧ (φ1 ∨ ... ∨ φk)-worlds to w. Thus, w1 is the unique world in the set of
the closest ψ ∧ φ1-worlds to w. By the truth of (ψ ∧ φ1)→ φ2 in w, w1 is
a φ2-world. Note that w1 is also the unique world in the set of the closest
ψ ∧ φ2-worlds to w. It follows from a similar argument in proving that w1 is
the unique world in the set of the closest ψ ∧ φ1-worlds to w.
Next, consider any formulas φi and φj where i and j ranged from 1 to k
and i 6= j. From the initial supposition on distinct formulas, φi and φj are
guaranteed to be distinct relative to ψ. Then, by applying the stated argument
again and again, w1 is the unique world in the closest ψ ∧ φi-worlds to w and
also that in the closest ψ ∧ φj-worlds to w. This fact is derived from the truth
of ((ψ ∧ φi−1)→ φi) and ((ψ ∧ φj−1)→ φj) in w. So, it follows that w1 is a
φi-world and a φj-world. Hence, ((ψ ∧ φi)→ φj)∧((ψ ∧ φj)→ φi) is true in
w. 
Lemma 3.3.5. For any M ∈ MS, where M = 〈W, I, f〉 such that for any
world w ∈ W , any event EY , and any single events EX1 , ...,EXk (where
k ≥ 2), if ∧ 1≤i≤k,1≤j≤k,i6=j D(EXi , EXj |EY ) and (∧ 1≤i≤k−1 (EXi ⇒
EXi+1 |EY ) ∧ (EXk ⇒ EX1 |EY )) are true in w, then it is true in w that
D(EXi , EXj |EY )⊃ ((EXi ⇒EXj |EY )∧ (EXj ⇒ EXi |EY )), for any EXi , EXj
∈ {EX1 , ..., EXk}.21
Proof. Firstly, suppose that
∧
1≤i≤k,1≤j≤k,i6=j D(EXi , EXj |EY ) and
(
∧
1≤i≤k−1 (EXi ⇒EXi+1|EY ) ∧ (EXk ⇒ EX1 |EY )) are true in w. That is,
((O(EY )∧ O(EXi))→ O(EXi+1))∧((O(EY )∧∼O(EXi))→∼O(EXi+1)) and
((O(EY )∧O(EXk))→O(EX1))∧((O(EY )∧∼O(EXk)) →∼O(EX1)) are true
in w. Then, consider any EXi , EXj ∈ {EX1 , ..., EXk}, D(EXi , EXj |EY ) is guar-
anteed to be true in w given that
∧
1≤i≤k,1≤j≤k,i6=j D(EXi , EXj |EY ) is true in w.
Thus, by Lemma 3.3.4, the following formulas are true in w:
21This lemma is the core premise in the abovementioned argument. It expresses the
idea that, if there is a cyclic counterfacutal dependence among distinct single events
EX1 , ..., EXk , then there is a mutual counterfactual dependence between any single events
EXi , EXj in {EX1 , ..., EXk}.
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((O(EY ) ∧O(EXi))→O(EXj))∧((O(EY )∧∼O(EXi))→∼O(EXj)),
((O(EY ) ∧O(EXj))→O(EXi))∧((O(EY )∧∼O(EXj))→∼O(EXi)).
Hence, ((EXi⇒EXj |EY ) ∧ (EXj⇒EXi |EY )) is true in w. 
Theorem 3.3.6. (NC) is valid in MSR.
Proof. By Theorem 2.4.2, (C5t3) is valid in MSR. That is, for any event
EY , and any single events EXi and EXj , D(EXi , EXj |EY )⊃ ((EXi ⇒ EXj |EY ) ⊃
∼(EXj ⇒ EXi |EY )) is true in every w ∈ W , for anyM = 〈W, I, f〉 ∈MSR. By
reductio, suppose that
∧
1≤i≤k,1≤j≤k,i6=jD(EXi , EXj |EY ) and (
∧
1≤i≤k−1 (EXi ⇒
EXi+1|EY ) ∧ (EXk ⇒ EX1|EY )) are also true in an arbitrary world w ∈ W . Con-
sider single events EXi , EXj∈ {EX1 , ..., EXk} and an event EY . D(EXi , EXj |EY )
is true in w given the truth of
∧
1≤i≤k,1≤j≤k,i6=jD(EXi , EXj |EY ) in w′. By
Lemma 3.3.5, it follows that ((EXi ⇒ EXj |EY ) ∧ (EXj ⇒ EXi|EY )) is true in
w. Then, it derives a contradiction with (C5t3). Thus, either
∧
1≤i≤k,1≤j≤k,i6=j
D(EXi , EXj |EY ) is false or (
∧
1≤i≤k−1 (EXi ⇒EXi+1|EY ) ∧ (EXk ⇒ EX1|EY ))
is false in w. Hence, (NC) follows. 
Given the Theorem 2.4.18 in chapter 2 thatVCSR is a complete axiomatization
for L with respect to MSR, (NC) is a theorem in VCSR.
To summarize, in order to avoid the mentioned peculiarity in Pearl’s logic
by disallowing any length of cyclic counterfactual dependence, adopting gen-
eralized reversibility is sufficient. Surprisingly, the equivalent form of general-
ized reversibility in the Lewis-Stalnaker framework (i.e. (NC)) is contained in
VCSR, which is an extension of Stalnaker’s logic which incorporates translated
reversibility (i.e. (C5t3)).
Here is a slightly different way to appreciate the result. Pearl’s logic, as
already noted, is peculiar because it allows cycles of counterfactual dependence
except those of length two. In other words, mutual counterfactual dependence
has a peculiar and special status in Pearl’s logic. Now we see that the status
of mutual counterfactual dependence in Stalnaker’s logic is also special, and
perhaps no less peculiar than, but in an opposite way to that in Pearl’s. In
Stalnaker’s logic, although cycles of counterfactual dependence are allowed in
general, there is no cycle that does not contain mutual dependence. That is of
course why adding a principle that forbids mutual counterfactual dependence
into Stalnaker’s logic is sufficient for ruling out all cycles. To put another way,
counterfactual dependence becomes a transitive concept within a cycle of coun-
terfactual dependence, yet counterfactual dependence per se is not transitive.
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CHAPTER 4
Conclusion
This thesis offers a detailed investigation on a characteristic principle named
reversibility in Pearl’s causal modeling framework, in comparison with the
renowned Stalnaker-Lewis counterfactual logics. Chapter 2 suggests that Stal-
naker’s logic is more analogous to Pearl’s logic than Lewis’s logic, because
the principle of definiteness in Pearl’s logic is, in its translated form, valid
in Stalnaker’s semantics but not in Lewis’s. Next, Pearl’s principle of re-
versibility, which is entailed by the principles of definiteness and equality, is
discussed. Then, a question of how to translate reversibility into the language
of Stalnaker-Lewis framework is raised. After finding an appropriate transla-
tion of the principle of reversibility, I show that the principle is not valid in
Stalnaker’s semantics. I then study the logic resulting from adding the prin-
ciple into Stalnaker’s logic, and proved its soundness and completeness with
respect to a subclass of Stalnakerian models.
The most important result of this thesis is presented in chapter 3. As Zhang
et al. (2012) has shown, a special case of reversibility is precisely the claim that
counterfactual dependence between distinct events is irreversible. Chapter 3
extends this result, and shows that even in its full generality, the principle of
reversibility is essentially a statement about (some sort of) irreversibility of
(some sort of) counterfactual dependence.
Zhang et al. (2012) also argues that Pearl’s logic is peculiar as it rules out
reversible or mutual counterfactual dependence between distinct events, thanks
to the principle of reversibility, but allows cyclic counterfactual dependence that
involves more than two distinct events.
The peculiarity raises the question on what logics rule out cyclic counterfac-
tual dependence in general. Although a stronger Pearlian logic which contains
the principle of recursiveness does, it is more than necessary. I advocate a
weaker logic which incorporates a more general principle of reversibility (i.e.
(GC5)), which is sufficient to avoid the peculiarity. Finally, I show that the
translated form of (GC5) is already contained in the logic developed in chapter
2.
I shall end this thesis by indicating some open problems.
First, it is an open question whether there is any good reason to allow cyclic
but not mutual counterfactual dependence. In Zhang et al. (2012), we attempt
an explanation which might justify the peculiarity. For example, one cannot
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tell from the structure of the dependence whether two families of events E1 and
E2 are identical if they have mutual counterfactual dependence. By contrast, if
one is told that families of events E1, E2, and E3 form a cycle of counterfactual
dependence that does not contain any sub-cycle of length two, the structure
entails the non-identity of the events under some reasonable criterion of event
identity (Indeed, one may argue that Leibniz’s Law of the indiscernibility of
identicals suffice to account for the non-identity). The criterion we have in
mind is a counterfactual criterion of event identity, which is inspired by the
causal criterion of event identity due to Davidson (1969).
Another question concerns the significance of (GC5). Unlike Pearl’s elegant
characterization of Tuniq(S), the class of models with unique solution, by re-
versibility (i.e. (C5)), and that of Trec(S), the class of models with no feedback
relation, by recursiveness (i.e. (C6)), it is not obvious what particular feature
the class of models characterized by (GC5) consists. One possibility is that
the class of models can be characterized by some sort of token-recursiveness.
Usually, in the literature on causation, recursiveness refers to no feedback re-
lation among variables. But there can also be recursiveness at the value-level,
or what I called token-recursiveness. For example, it is intuitively clear that
John’s being late for school and his insomnia the night before do not causally
influence one another, even though it is not entirely implausible that being
late and insomnia have no mutual causal influence in general. Thus, (GC5)
may correspond to the models which forbid the causal cyclicity of localized
event-tokens. However, the details need to be further explored.
Finally, as Halpern (2010) showed, there is a formula which is valid in
Stalnaker’s logic but invalid in Pearl’s logic. Together with the fact that re-
versibility is not valid in Stalnaker’s logic, these two logics are not comparable.
It is natural to expect that VCSR is the weakest common extension of them.
But a rigorous statement and proof of this conjecture has to await another
occasion.
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Appendix
The following Lewisian model (i.e. a model inM) contains no pairwise mu-
tual (relative) counterfactual dependence, but the principle of reversibility fails
to hold. Thus, it is a counter-model to the claim that irreversibility principle
3 entails the principle of reversibility in Lewis’s VC.
M = 〈W, I, f〉
W = {w0, w1, ..., w17}
EX = {Ex0 , Ex1}, EY = {Ey1 , Ey2 , Ey3},EZ = {Ez1 , Ez2 , Ez3}
O(Ex0), O(Ex1), O(Ey1), O(Ey2), O(Ey3), O(Ez1), O(Ez2), O(Ez3) ∈ L
Iw0(O(Ex0))=Iw0(O(Ey1))=Iw0(O(Ez1))= T
Iw1(O(Ex1))=Iw1(O(Ey1))=Iw1(O(Ez1))= T
Iw2(O(Ex1))=Iw2(O(Ey2))=Iw2(O(Ez2))= T
Iw3(O(Ex1))=Iw3(O(Ey2))=Iw3(O(Ez3))= T
Iw4(O(Ex1))=Iw4(O(Ey3))=Iw4(O(Ez2))= T
Iw5(O(Ex0))=Iw5(O(Ey2))=Iw5(O(Ez2))= T
Iw6(O(Ex0))=Iw6(O(Ey2))=Iw6(O(Ez3))= T
Iw7(O(Ex0))=Iw7(O(Ey3))=Iw7(O(Ez2))= T
Iw8(O(Ex1))=Iw8(O(Ey1))=Iw8(O(Ez2))= T
Iw9(O(Ex1))=Iw9(O(Ey1))=Iw9(O(Ez3))= T
Iw10(O(Ex1))=Iw10(O(Ey2))=Iw10(O(Ez1))= T
Iw11(O(Ex1))=Iw11(O(Ey3))=Iw11(O(Ez1))= T
Iw12(O(Ex1))=Iw12(O(Ey3))=Iw12(O(Ez3))= T
Iw13(O(Ex0))=Iw13(O(Ey1))=Iw13(O(Ez2))= T
Iw14(O(Ex0))=Iw14(O(Ey1))=Iw14(O(Ez3))= T
Iw15(O(Ex0))=Iw15(O(Ey2))=Iw15(O(Ez1))= T
Iw16(O(Ex0))=Iw16(O(Ey3))=Iw16(O(Ez1))= T
Iw17(O(Ex0))=Iw17(O(Ey3))=Iw17(O(Ez3))= T
f(O(Ex1), w0) = {w1, w2, w3, w4}, f(O(Ex0), w0) = {w0},
f(O(Ex1) ∧O(Ey1), w0) = f(O(Ex1) ∧O(Ez1), w0) = {w1},
f(O(Ex1) ∧O(Ey2), w0) = {w2, w3},
f(O(Ex1) ∧O(Ez2), w0) = {w2, w4},
f(O(Ex1) ∧O(Ey3), w0) = {w4}, f(O(Ex1) ∧O(Ez3), w0) = {w3},
f(O(Ex0) ∧O(Ey1), w0) = f(O(Ex0) ∧O(Ez1), w0) = {w0},
f(O(Ex0) ∧O(Ey2), w0) = {w5, w6},
f(O(Ex0) ∧O(Ez2), w0) = {w5, w7},
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f(O(Ex0) ∧O(Ey3), w0) = {w7}, f(O(Ex0) ∧O(Ez3), w0) = {w6},
f(O(Ex1) ∧O(Ey1) ∧O(Ez2), w0) = {w8},
f(O(Ex1) ∧O(Ey1) ∧O(Ez3), w0) = {w9},
f(O(Ex1) ∧O(Ey2) ∧O(Ez1), w0) = {w10},
f(O(Ex1) ∧O(Ey3) ∧O(Ez1), w0) = {w11},
f(O(Ex1) ∧O(Ey3) ∧O(Ez3), w0) = {w12},
f(O(Ex0) ∧O(Ey1) ∧O(Ez2), w0) = {w13},
f(O(Ex0) ∧O(Ey1) ∧O(Ez3), w0) = {w14},
f(O(Ex0) ∧O(Ey2) ∧O(Ez1), w0) = {w15},
f(O(Ex0) ∧O(Ey3) ∧O(Ez1), w0) = {w16},
f(O(Ex0) ∧O(Ey3) ∧O(Ez3), w0) = {w17}.
In this model, for example, ((O(Ex1) ∧ O(Ey1))→ O(Ez1)) and ((O(Ex1) ∧
O(Ez1))→ O(Ey1)) are true in w0, yet (O(Ex1)→ O(Ey1)) is false in w0.
Note that the existence of {w8, . . . , w17} aims to capture the antecedent of the
irreversibility principle 3 that D(EY , EZ |Ex0) and D(EY , EZ |Ex1) are true in
w0. That is, EY and EZ are distinct families of events relative to Ex0 and also
Ex1 .
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